COMMENTS
ARE VERDICTS, TOO, LIKE SAUSAGES?:
LIFTING THE CLOAK OFJURY SECRECY
CLIFFORD HOLT RUPRECHTt
If you like laws and sausages, you should never watch either one being
made.

This Comment argues that jury deliberations should be transcribed as part of the ordinary trial record and be subject to a limited
judicial review. Such limited review is the proper way to mediate the
conflict between two important political principles. On the one
hand, there is a pragmatic need to accept some degree of imperfection in our political institutions and to permit such imperfection to2
pass unexamined-hence the appeal of Bismarck's wry comment.
On the other hand, meaningful self-government requires accountability of the government to the governed. Hence, the principle
behind Bismarck's remark should be deeply troubling to any proponent of the democratic ideal, for that principle demands a degree of
popular acquiescence to the conduct of government in secret, which
is a step in the direction of government without the consent of the
t B.A. 1986, Williams College; Ph.D. 1995, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate
1998, University of Pennsylvania. I wish to acknowledge the support of the staff of the
Law Review. Their gracious assistance and tireless industry have saved me many
embarrassments in the publication of this piece. Most importantly, I am so grateful to
Patty Ruprecht, for her good humor, her patience with me, and her company. To her
I have dedicated all-and so this little work, too.
' This quotation is widely attributed to Otto von Bismarck, but the attribution is
unverified. SeeRESPECTrULLY QUOTED 190 (Suzy Platt ed., 1992).
2 This pragmatic acceptance of imperfection is an important feature
of our
judicial institutions, as the harmless-error doctrine shows: "IT]he Constitution entitles
a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673, 681 (1986). In fact, "there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect
trial"; hence, "the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial." United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1983). The Supreme Court has applied this principle
equally in the civil context, stating that a civil litigant, too, is only entitled to a fair, not
a perfect, trial, and commenting that "[i]t seems doubtful that our judicial system
would have the resources to provide litigants with perfect trials." McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984).
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governed. An important political question is how to strike the
proper balance between the pragmatic refusal to demand perfection
of our political institutions and the countervailing demand of accountability of those institutions to the governed. With respect to
jury deliberations, this means striking the proper balance between the
need for jury secrecy and the public's demand to supervise the jury's
activity.
To insist on the near-absolute secrecy of jury deliberations, as
courts and commentators routinely do, is to ignore the need for
balance, favoring pragmatic secrecy over principled openness. 5
Where government activity must be conducted in secret, so that the
actors are not accountable directly to the public, those actors should
be overseen by, and accountable to, other government representatives. 6 The jury, however, is essentially accountable to no one. Jurors

3 AsJustice Stevens has noted: "'A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.'"
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 22, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES
MADISON, 1819-1836, at 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)).
' What one author has said of this balance with regard to foreign policy is true of
public policy generally:
Secrecy is both necessary and antithetical to the foreign policy processes
of democratic government: necessary, because foreign affairs may involve
sensitive... relationships that cannot withstand the often destructive inquiry
of a divisive political arena; yet antithetical, because [that policy turns on]
values best expounded through robust civic discussion, which secrecy inhibits
and impairs.
Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and NationalSecurity Information, 103 HARV. L.

REV. 906, 906 (1990).
5 I do not mean to suggest that secrecy is necessarily unprincipled. One commentator, for example, explains that:
[S]ome tension exists between the openness and responsiveness that American society demands of most government processes and the privacy and independence that it accords to the deliberations of the jury. But this tension is
no fortuity: the American jury was probably designed partly to resist the very
impulses of majoritarianism that press for the exposure of deliberations in
any given case.
Note, PublicDisclosures ofJuy Deliberations,96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 894 (1983) (footnote
omitted). Nonetheless, the justifications offered for the secrecy ofjury deliberations
are often based on pragmatic considerations rather than principles. See id. at 891-92,
897 (justifyring secrecy on the pragmatic grounds of finality, authoritativeness, and
buttressing public faith in the verdicts rendered).
6 Justice Stevens emphasized that:
[T]here are unquestionably occasions when governmental activity may properly be carried on in complete secrecy.... [S]ome functions of government-
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decide whether the coercive power of the state should be invoked to
deprive a party of liberty, property, or even life. Such governmental
decisionmakers should be accountable to the people.7 Jury secrecy, as
currently practiced, does not properly balance the pragmatic tolerance of imperfection and the public's demand for accountability.
While jury secrecy as currently practiced is too extreme, the remedy to this is not a general right of access to jury deliberations. The
secrecy of the jury is a treasured feature of our common-law heritage,8
and a proposal to infringe in any way on that secrecy should expect
strong resistance. Any claim for a general right of access to jury
deliberations ignores the valid insight that some degree of jury secrecy is probably necessary to the fair and efficient administration of
justice.
Failure to acknowledge the legitimacy of both of these opposing
claims impairs critical reflection on the institution of the jury. To
illustrate this point, the Comment analyzes the debate over CBS's
recent network-television broadcast of jury deliberations.9 The controversy nicely demonstrates the need for a critical attitude more
tolerant of compromise and more amenable to the proposal ad-

essential to the protection of the public and indeed our country's vital interests-necessarily require a large measure of secrecy, subject to appropriatelegislative oversight. In such situations the reasons for withholding information from
the public are both apparent and legitimate.
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 34-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict
Interviews, 1993 U. ILL L. REv. 295, 313 (noting the view that "jurors are public servants; exposing them to public scrutiny would enhance their accountability to the
community they represent"); infra Part III.A (arguing that jury secrecy as currently
practiced unnecessarily undermines "the public's interest in supervised government
processes").
The First Circuit has recognized that the role of jurors as government decisionmakers ("citizen soldiers") disfavors juror anonymity: "[T]he prospect of criminal
justice being routinely meted out by unknown persons does not comport with democratic values of accountability and openness." In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88,
98 (lst Cir. 1990).
8 SeeAbraham Abramovsky, Cameras in theJuiy Room: Education or Danger?,N.Y. LJ.,
Apr. 8, 1996, at 3 ("Arguing against the filming ofjury deliberations ... isa centuriesold tradition ofjury privacy that is a treasured part of the jurisprudence of federal and
state courts.").
" See CBS Reports: Enter theJury Room (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1997)
[hereinafter CBS Reports]. Because the transcript is readily available from Burrelle's
Transcripts, Livingston, NJ, references to CBS Reports will be followed, where appropriate, by a page reference to the transcript.
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vanced here: to supervise the jury's decisionmaking more closely
than it traditionally has been.
Consequently, the structure of the Comment is as follows. Part I
explains the background of the CBS project and the procedure followed in taping the jury deliberations for network broadcast. Part II
surveys arguments for and against televising jury deliberations. On
the basis of Parts I and II, Part III shows that neither the near-absolute
secrecy that jury deliberations currently enjoy nor the network broadcast of jury deliberations is desirable. Part III then argues that a
mediating alternative is more appropriate: Transcribing jury deliberations for judicial review satisfies the demand for public accountability underlying the efforts to televise jury deliberations, while
protecting the jury from some of the more unwanted intrusions that
television broadcast entails. Part IV examines the legality of recording jury deliberations for judicial review. While no constitutional
impediment to such a procedure exists, there are certain statutes and
rules that would bar the procedure; Part IV therefore recommends
amendments to those statutes and rules. Part V then offers some
proposals as to the nature and scope of judicial review of a jurydeliberation transcript.
I. THE CBS PROJECT: BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE

In April 1997, the CBS television network aired a documentary
consisting primarily of actual footage of criminaljury deliberations."0
This Part describes the historical background of the project and the
procedure followed in taping jury deliberations for network broadcast.
The CBS project is simply the latest in a series of public inquiries
into juries' secret deliberations. Post-verdict interviews of jurors by
the media are quite common and have been the subject of significant
legal commentary." There have also been other forms of media
intrusion into, as well as nonmedia public inspection of,jury deliberations.
Possibly the most infamous inquiry into jury deliberations was
,0 See id. The producer of CBS Reportshas very recently published a useful summary
of the project and his assessment of what the project reveals about the need for jury
reform. See David Schneider, Jury Deliberations and the NeedforJury Reform: An Outsider's
View, JUDGES'J., Fall 1997, at 23.
" See generally, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 7 (exploring the problems with postverdict interviews); Note, supra note 5 (same).
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conducted not by the media but by social-science researchers. Members of the Chicago Jury Project tape-recorded jury deliberations in
the Federal District Court in Wichita, Kansas. The revelation of this
breach of jury secrecy and the ensuing scandal 3 prompted Congress
to enact an absolute ban on any recording ofjury deliberations in the
federal courts. 4 Despite the scandal, the intrusion produced a study
of the American jury that remains preeminently authoritative.'5
12

See H.R REP. No. 84-2807, at 1-2 (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4149,

4149. While the taping took place with the permission of the court, the jurors neither
consented to nor knew of the recording. See id. at 2, reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4149, 4149.
IS The participants were called before the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security Act. The ostensible purpose of the hearing
was "to permit assessment of the impact of this activity upon the integrity of the jury
system, as a basis for decision respecting what legislation may be necessary to protect
the jury system." RecordingofJuiy Deliberations: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. to Investigate
the Admin. of the Internal Sec. Act and Other Internal Sec. Laws of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong. 1 (1955) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. James 0.
Eastland, Chairman of the Subcommittee). The proceedings as a whole, however, had
the inquisitorial feel of the hunts for "subversives" common at the time. Seeid. at 23-31
(questioning Edward H. Levi, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, as to
knowledge of suspected Communists, membership in suspect organizations, and
public statements critical of the House Un-American Activities Committee); id. at 4657 (questioning Harry Kalven, Jr., as to his sympathy for the Rosenbergs); id. at 84-103
(questioning Mr. Kalven as to agreement with statements of Communists, and as to his
public statements on the Oppenheimer affair, membership in suspect organizations,
and participation in suspect rallies). In this light, the Chairman's expression of fear
that "there may be some criticism of the subcommittee in this instance for venturing
into a matter which does not appear to involve subversives or subversion," id. at 1,
appears at best unfounded and, at worst, disingenuous.
14 See Act of Aug. 2, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-919, 70 Stat. 935 (1956) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1994)). Section 1508 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully, by any means or device whatsoever(a) records or attempts to record, the proceedings of any grand or
petitjury in any court of the United States while such jury is deliberating
or voting...
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1508(a).
'- See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY (1966) (detailing the
findings of a broad, social-science study of American juries).
Ironically, the continued preeminence of that study is surely due in part to the
legislative action that was meant to impugn the authors. Since the enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 1508, social-science research has made do without entering the actual jury
room. Researchers have probed the jury's deliberative process by studying various
substitutes for actual juries. The most popular substitutes are "mock juries" (panels
selected just as actual juries might be selected, but deciding a fictitious case, often
under conditions not identical to actual trial conditions) and "shadow juries" (panels
that observe a real trial or hear the evidence actually adduced at trial and decide the
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While the Chicago Jury Project may be the most striking example
of inspection of jury deliberations, media inquiries into the jury's
secret deliberations are more common. Typically, the media probe
the jury's deliberations through post-verdict interviews, but other
techniques also have been tried. Television producers have reassembled actual juries to reconstruct their deliberations before the camera. 6 And on one prior occasion, a jury deliberation has been
broadcast on television. PBS filmed the deliberation of a jury in a
Wisconsin criminal trial for a documentary that was aired in 1986.17
Never before, however, has a commercial broadcast network televised
the deliberations of either a criminal or a civiljury1
As it turned out, CBS was able to film criminal juries only, because the project underwent significant changes between planning
and execution. CBS proposed to record the deliberations of criminal
juries in Arizona and of civil juries in Maine. The high courts of each
state granted permission for the filming. 9 The recording of civil

case, for the purpose of observing the deliberation and comparing the result with that
of the actual jury). The theoretical value of such ersatz juries as objects of study is
contested. See generallyJERALD GREENBERG & ROBERT FOLGER, CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
IN SOCIAL RESEARcH METHODS 61-78 (1988) (exploring concerns about the artificiality
and limited generalizability of "laboratory experiments" in the social sciences). This
partially explains the special reverence accorded The American Jury. As the authors
explain after summarizing the scandal regarding the Wichitajury:
None of the Wichita data is included in this book, nor will it be included
in future books. We note the episode here simply to make clear to that man
who would say, "That's all very interesting, professors, but did you ever hear a
real jury deliberate?" that the answer is Yes, and to point out that one of the
distinctions of the jury study is that it is a research project that has a Purple
Heart.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra, at vii.
'6 See United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 861, 861-62 (D. Md. 1961) (describing a
videotaped reenactment ofjury deliberations by nine jurors that was broadcast on a
local television station).
17 See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8,
1986)
(documenting jury deliberations in the case of a sympathetic defendant charged with
unlawful possession of a firearm, which resulted in an acquittal despite the defendant's concession at trial of his guilt on all elements of the crime charged).
"8 See Jason Wolfe, TVJustice Documentary Won't Include Maine Jurors, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, May 18, 1996, at IA, available in LEXIS, News Library, Portps File
(noting that the CBS project is "unprecedented in commercial television").
9 In Maine, the high court granted permission through a formal, published order.
See Administrative Order, No. SJC-228, 1996 Me. LEXIS 32 (Feb. 5, 1996) [hereinafter
Administrative Order] (authorizing CBS to record the deliberations subject to certain
conditions). The Maine court's order engendered an immediate effort, ultimately
unsuccessful, to bar the recording through emergency legislative action. See Wolfe,
supra note 18, at IA (reporting that the dissent to the administrative order "prompted
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juries in Maine, however, ultimately fell through. Producers identified seventeen docket entries as candidates for taping but were only
able to find one case in which both parties would consent to having
the jury filmed. That case, an automobile-accident negligence claim,
settled shortly before trial. The producers hurriedly tried to find
another case to film, but were unsuccessful and gave up in the face of
impending production deadlines.
CBS has successfully recorded four criminal trials and deliberations in Arizona.2 ' The production protocol followed in Arizona was
essentially the same as that submitted to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court,2 which incorporated the protocol by reference in the court's

administrative order23

a state lawmaker to propose emergency legislation to outlaw electronic taping of ajury
session to protect the secretjury process").
There was high drama in this legislative phase. The state House of Representatives
endorsed the bill 131-11, but in the waning days of the legislative session, the Senate
rejected the bill by one vote. See Senate Rejects Bill to BlockJuiy Taping PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Mar. 31, 1996, at 7B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Portps File. The
Senate's refusal to appoint a conference committee spelled the project's end. See
Maine Won't Ban CamerasfromJuy Room, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 3,1996, at 10A,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, Portps File.
News of the project also inspired scholarly criticism. See Abramovsky, supra note 8
(arguing that the Maine order was wrongly issued and that other courts should not
follow Maine's lead). The public character of the Maine court's grant of permission
certainly contributed to the attention that the issue received in Maine, and the turmoil
that ensued "likely contributed to the difficulties in finding a case" there. Wolfe, supra
note 18 (citing an attorney closely involved with the project).
In Arizona, the procedure was much more informal. A CBS producer who had a
prior acquaintance with Judge Michael Dann of the Maricopa County Superior Court
approached Judge Dann about the prospect of taping in Arizona. Judge Dann then
discussed the issue with ChiefJustice Stanley Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court.
After clearing the matter with the rest of the high court, the ChiefJustice gave CBS
verbal permission to pursue the project, subject to the consent of the trial court, the
parties, counsel, and the jurors. See Telephone Interview with Hon. Michael Dann,
Judge of the Superior Court of Maricopa County (Nov. 13, 1996). In light of the
trouble in Maine, the Arizona procedure was certainly the more effective course.
20 SeeWolfe, supra note 18.
21 See Telephone Interview with David Schneider, Senior
Producer, CBS Reports,
CBS, Inc. (Nov. 4, 1996).
22 See id.
2 See CBS Reports:
Inside the Jury Room-Production Protocol, Jan. 15, 1996,
Attachment to Administrative Order, supra note 19, at *6-*15 [hereinafter CBS Production Protocol]. The administrative order incorporates the production protocol by
express reference: "The project.., is to be conducted in accordance with the production protocol attached hereto." Administrative Order, supra note 19, at *1.
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The most relevant features of the procedure followed in the CBS
project are that consent not only of the court, but of all parties 24 and
of the individual jurors 25 was obtained, 26 and that the parties waived
27
the filming of the deliberations as a basis for appeal. Under these
conditions, highlights from the four Arizona criminal trials and deliberations were aired as part of CBS's documentary.28
II.

DEBATE ON THE CBS PROJECT: MAINTAINING ABSOLUTEJURY
SECRECY VERSUS TELEVISINGJURY DELIBERATIONS

Debate surrounding the CBS project illustrates the problems that
arise from the failure to acknowledge the need to compromise between two competing values: (1) accountability and (2) pragmatic
tolerance of imperfection in our political institutions. The CBS
project and other public inquiries into jury deliberations are certainly
instances of sensationalism in the media. These inquiries, however,
also indicate an understandable desire for a more accountable jury
system.

2' See CBS Production Protocol, supra note 23, at *9 (suggesting that the court may
obtain consent of the parties but requesting involvement of CBS in the process).
See id. at *9-*10 (recommending that consent be obtained prior to impaneling
the jury by prescreening the venire and excusing nonconsenting venirepersons to
serve on otherjuries).
26 See CBS Reports, supra note 9, at 5 (noting the consent of all involved in the
filming).
27 See CBS Production Protocol, supra note 23, at *9 (detailing the consents
and
waivers required and the procedures to be followed).
See Telephone Interview with David Schneider, supra note 21. CBS filmed four
trials but only three cases. One of the four trials filmed was a retrial after a hung jury
resulted in a mistrial. The three cases were:
(1) Arizona v. Lopez, involving a charge of armed robbery, with the jury asked to
resolve conflicting testimony on whether the defendant in fact drew a gun while
stealing beer from a store, see CBS Reports, supra note 9, at 5-32;
(2) Arizona v. Solano, involving charges of drug possession, trafficking, and conspiracy, with the key jury issue being the defendant's knowledge that there were 128
pounds of marijuana and one kilogram of cocaine in the suitcases she was carrying
upon arrest at the airport, see id. at 32-50; this case had to be retried due to a hung
jury, and CBS filmed the retrial as well, seeid. at 50-59; and
(3) Arizona v. York, involving a charge of aggravated assault, with the jury asked to
decide whether the defendant acted recklessly or reasonably in firing a shotgun at and
wounding a man the defendant thought had a gun, see id. at 59-70; this was the defendant's second of three trials and was the only trial of the defendant that CBS filmed;
the first two trials resulted in hung juries, and the third trial resulted in an acquittal,
see id. at 70.
While a desire for ratings surely played a key role in CBS's business decision to
air the documentary, the network has suggested that the editorial motivation for the
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There is a similar mixture of illegitimate and legitimate motivations in the opposition to the CBS project. On the one hand, opposition arises from an illegitimate, purely reactionary, conservatism that
resists change merely because it is change. 0 On the other hand,
opposition also arises out of a legitimate concern for the preservation
of the
dignity of our judicial institutions and the neutrality of the
3
jury. '
This Part of the Comment endeavors to demonstrate three points.
First, detractors have attacked the CBS project merely because it
involves a breach ofjury secrecy. This criticism manifests a knee-jerk
conservatism and is not an adequate criticism of the project. 2 Second, CBS's critics make a more persuasive point when their criticism
is directed at the project's special character as a televised breach of
jury secrecy. Nonetheless, this criticism is not tempered by any acknowledgment of the legitimate desire to inspect the jury's activity.
This weakens the criticism significantly.33 Third, a more valid criticism of the CBS project, one that recognizes the legitimacy of the
concern for accountability that animates the project, is that this media inspection of the jury's deliberations cannot be supported by any
of the traditional justifications of press access to government acivity.'
Overall, this Part of the Comment seeks to establish that there is a
legitimate need to observe more closely the jury's deliberations, and

project is to provide "a remarkable opportunity to consider the question: Does the
road to justice lead through the jury room?" CBS Reports,supra note 9, at 3.
ChiefJustice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court noted that it was "a difficult
decision" to permit CBS to "intrud[e] into the sanctity of the jury room," and acknowledges a "fear that we might, by observing, change the ... process, change the
result." Id. at 4. Nonetheless, ChiefJustice Feldman decided to grant CBS permission
as a way of rendering the jury more accountable: "So I thought to myself that, 'Well, if
you think this is... such a good system for the people of the United States, well, the
people of the United States ought to have.., a look at it and judge for themselves.'"
Id. at5.
Both CBS and ChiefJustice Feldman sought to render the jury system accountable
to the public, not to render the juries themselves accountable for their verdicts. The
lack of accountability of the jury for its decisions is an abiding source of criticism of
the institution. See Hearings,supra note 13, at 73 (memorandum submitted by Harry
Kalven, Jr.) (noting the argument that juries make worse factfinders and policy deciders than judges because jurors "don't have to live with their decisions, and haven't
got their reputations and professional standings at stake").
See infra Part II.A.
s' See infra Part II.B.
32

See infra Part II.A.

s See infra Part II.B.
' See infra Part II.C.
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that failure to acknowledge this need leads to two problems. At the
social level, failure to acknowledge the need to supervise the jury
invites attempts like the CBS project to address the need through
undesirable means. At the analytical level, failure to acknowledge this
need (for instance, by insisting that jury secrecy remain as absolute as
it has been traditionally) impoverishes critical reflection on problems
involving the jury (like the CBS project).
A. TraditionalJustificationsofJuy Secrecy Do Not Justify
Opposition to the CBS Project
Some critics have opposed the CBS project simply because it runs
afoul of a long tradition of secret jury deliberations. 35 These arguments ignore the fact that the CBS project was carefully tailored to
avoid infringing upon the interests traditionally protected by jury
secrecy. Consequently, the traditional arguments for jury secrecy are
insufficient to justify opposition to the CBS project, and accordingly,
criticizing the project merely because it involves a breach of secrecy is
not persuasive.
Three claims typically are offered to justify the near-absolute
jury secrecy that exists in American courts: Secrecy encourages frank
37
discussion among jurors; secrecy promotes the stability of verdicts;
and secrecy respects the privacy of jurors. 8 None of these justifications warrants banning the CBS project.
1. Frankness of Discussion
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that "[f]reedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked ifjurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world."3 9 Other courts have employed similar logic,
reasoning that "the secrecy of jury deliberations fosters free, open,
and candid debate in reaching a decision." 40 Consequently, there is
See Abramovsky, supra note 8 ("Arguing against the filming of jury deliberations ... is a centuries-old tradition of jury privacy that is a treasured part of the
jurisprudence of federal and state courts.").
6 See infraPartII.A.1.
7 See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part II.A.3.

'9 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
" In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990). Importantly, despite
the long pedigree behind this principle, it has no clear empirical support. See infra
note 117 and accompanying text.
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no general public right of access to jury deliberations.4 ' But the
questions remain: Whose interest do jury secrecy and freedom of
debate promote? And more importantly, whose protected interest
does the CBS project infringe?
Arguably, the jurors, the parties, and the public all have an interest in ensuring that jury debates be free and open. The jurors have a
participatory interest in the proceeding. They exercise a civic duty
in sitting on a jury and have an interest analogous to the political
voters' interest.4 Therefore, a juror has a cognizable interest in
voting her conscience in a matter of grave public import unobstructed by concern for prying eyes on her vote.
The parties have an interest in ensuring that the jurors debate as
openly as possible: "The jury system is predicated on the insight that
people see and evaluate things differently. It is one function of the
jury to bring these divergent perceptions and evaluations to the trial
process."" Due to the jurors' divergent perceptions and evaluations,
each party presumably has interests that some jurors will represent
more vigorously than others. 4' Each party, therefore, has an interest
in encouraging zealous advocacy for that party before the other jurors. If a juror does not feel free to advocate openly for one party's
position, that party clearly suffers.
Finally,• 46
the public has an interest in the fairness of the judicial
proceeding. In large part, this fairness is a function of each party's
41See GlobeNewspaper, 920 F.2d at 94 ("There is... clearly no public right of access
to thejurors' deliberations themselves.").
412
See Mary A. Lynch, The Application of Equal Protection to Prospective Jurors with

Disabilities: Will Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289, 297 n.53
(1993) (noting that "jury service is ... a significant form of participation in our democratic andjudicial systems").
4 See id. at 297-98 (noting that "'with the exception of voting, for most citizens the
honor and privilege ofjury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in
the democratic process'" (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991))); cf
Powers, 499 U.S. at 408 (drawing an analogy between jury service and elective franchise,
and noting that a state may no more invidiously discriminate against the one privilege
than it may against the other).
4'Hans Zeisel ....And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the FederalJury, 38 U.
CHI.L. REv. 710, 715 (1971).
Cf Nancy S. Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics andJury Deliberations, 96 YALE LJ.
593, 599-600 (1987) (noting that under-participation by women jurors endangers the
accuracy and fairness of verdicts because men and women bring differing perspectives
to jury deliberations).
46See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984)
(acknowledging the "concerns of... the community in knowing that offenders are
being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly and openly
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position receiving a hearing before the jury (both at trial and in the
jury room) . Therefore, the public's interest is quite similar to the
parties' interest in free deliberation by the jurors.
Assuming that all the constituencies previously mentioned have
an interest in preserving freedom of debate among jurors, are these
interests trammeled when deliberations are televised with the consent
of the jurors, the parties, and the court? Probably not.
Significantly, the jurors consent to being filmed. One may question whether that consent is fully informed, given that most of the
jurors will not have known, at the time of consenting, what the deliberations will involve, or how they will feel about expressing themselves
freely before the camera. By the same token, however, jurors know
the general nature of the risk they have assumed: that there may be
sensitive matters that arise for discussion, and that the discussion will
be televised. It seems unnecessary to require that the juror foresee
precisely the scruples she may feel during deliberation in order for
her consent to be deemed informed. The jurors are fully cognizant
of the nature of the interest implicated when they consent to be
filmed, even if they are ignorant of the degree to which, or the exact
manner in which, that interest will be implicated. Consequently, it
seems unduly paternalistic to substitute the critic's judgment for the
jurors' own in determining how best to promote their interests.
Just as the CBS project does not improperly infringe on the jurors' interests, it does not improperly infringe on the parties' interests
either. The parties also consent to having their cause adjudicated by
ajury that consents to be filmed. It may be true that jurors may not
deliberate as freely as they should when faced with the reality of doing
so on camera. Hence, the parties' right to a fair adjudication may be

selected"); cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980)
(plurality opinion) ("[E]specially in the administration of criminal justice, the means
used to achieve justice must have the support derived from public acceptance of both
the process and its results."); Globe Newspaper, 920 F.2d at 93-94 ("[Olpen justice
serves... [to] ensur[e] public confidence in a trial's results through the appearance
of fairness....").
47 For example, the Supreme Court has held it to be a fundamental error for
a
court to give the jury instructions or to respond to jury queries when one party is not
present, whether in a civil case, see Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81
(1919) (noting that the parties in a civil case are entitled "to be present in person or
by counsel at all proceedings from the time the jury is impaneled until it is discharged
after rendering the verdict"), or in a criminal case, see Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S.
35, 38 (1975) (applying the Fillipponstandard to criminal cases).
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compromised by the filming.4 The parties, however, have even less
right to complain than thejurors. The risk of a stifled deliberation is
precisely the risk the parties assume when they consent to a televised
jury-and they do so with the benefit of counsel. In no sense is the
parties' consent uninformed. The parties willingly assume the risk of
a restricted deliberation, presumably in exchange for some perceived
gain.49 Again, the critics' judgment of the parties' best interests
should not be substituted for the parties' own judgment, particularly
as the matter concerns the parties far more significantly than it does
any critic.
But if the jury deliberates improperly due to the distorting influence of the television camera, is not the public's interest in the fairness and accuracy of the adjudication compromised? Arguably not.
The parties' consent does much to legitimate the proceeding. For
instance, parties may consent to having their cause tried by a lone
judge rather than by ajury, ° or they may submit to the binding decision of a single arbitrator, 5' even though we presume that the judgment of twelve is sounder than the judgment of one.52 The
legitimating force of the parties' voluntary choice of a deliberative
mechanism presumably offsets any delegitimization that might follow
from the diminution of the soundness of the judgment.
It is possible that in certain circumstances a consensual modification of the judicial process will not be honored by a court, on the
grounds that the public interest has been ill-served by the public's
proxy. For example, a plea bargain agreed upon by the defendant
and the prosecution may be rejected by the court.53 In these instances, the public's interest in the prosecution going forward is held
48 See Abramovsky, supra note 8 (discussing the dangers of videotaped delibera-

tions).
49 See Wolfe, supranote 18 (noting that one attorney who consented to having
his
client's case videotaped by CBS did so "as a tactical move" and thought that "jurors,
knowing they were being filmed, would pay closer attention to his defense").
'0 See generally 75B AM. JuR. 2D Trial § 1956 (1992) (explaining the right of parties
to waivejury participation).
S1See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994) (giving district courts
broad powers to enforce arbitration agreements).
52 See Sioux City & Pac. R.
Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873) ("It is assumed
that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one man, that they
can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than can a
singlejudge.").
53See, e.g., FED. K. CaiM. P. 11(e)(2) (permitting a federal court to reject a plea
agreement); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) (requiring a federal court to reject a voluntary plea
lacking any factual basis).
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to have been inadequately protected by the public's delegate, the
M
prosecutor.
More precisely, one delegated guardian of the public
interest, the judge, has exercised her superior authority to veto an
inferior delegate's (the prosecutor's) estimate of what the public
interest demands.
The situation is quite different when the parties consent to the
verdict of a filmed jury. In that event, the consent of the parties
combined with the consent of the public's delegate (the judge in a
civil case) or delegates (the judge and the prosecutor in a criminal
case) legitimates the entire undertaking. Under these circumstances,
it is difficult to argue that the public interest is insufficiently protected and that the consent of all involved must not only be disregarded but must also be disrespected.
2. Stability of Verdicts
Courts have long recognized that the public interest in the stability of verdicts, once rendered, counsels against receiving juror testimony to impeach the jurors' own verdict. This is true despite the
litigants' strong claim of a right to a trial by a fair and competentjury.
In McDonald v. Pless, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he argument in favor of receiving such evidence [juror testimony] is
not only very strong, but unanswerable-when looked at solely from the
standpoint of the private party who has been wronged by [juror] misconduct. The argument, however has not been sufficiently convincing
to induce legislatures generally to repeal or to modify the rule [barring
such evidence]. For, while it may often exclude the only possible evidence of misconduct, a change in the rule "would open the door to the
most pernicious arts and tampering with jurors." "The practice would
be replete with dangerous consequences." "It would
lead to the grossest
55
fraud and abuse" and "no verdict would be safe."

Accordingly, the Court held that juror testimony revealing a quotient
verdict could not be received to disturb the improperly rendered
verdict, despite the fact that several jurors disagreed with the verdict
56
and assented only because they felt bound by a prior agreement.
5 See Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging CriminalJustice Systems:
Guilty Pleas and the
Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 571-72 (1996) (noting that a judge should reject a
guilty plea when it is not in the public interest and describing the "consensus" on the
criteria ajudge should apply in rejecting a plea).
55238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915) (citations omitted).
56 See id. at 269 ("[l t is safe to say that there is nothing in the nature of the present

case warranting a departure from what is unquestionably the general rule, that the
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. The Court recognized that in disallowing such juror testimony, it
"chooses the lesser of two evils" because it "must choose between
[not] redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the
public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as
to what had happened in the jury room." T It would be circular to
reason that the public injury is the breach of jury secrecy as such.
Rather, the Court reasoned that the stability of verdicts, however
wrongly rendered, is more important than the litigant's right to a
valid determination of his cause."s
Recognizing a strong public interest in the stability of verdicts
once entered, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides that
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, ajuror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, except that ajuror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon anyjuror. Nor may ajuror's affidavit or
evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which
the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these pur59
poses.

Of course, the CBS project does not threaten the stability of verdicts. The parties expressly waive the recording of the jury as the
basis for an appeal.6 Consequently, the project poses no threat of
disturbing the verdicts rendered. 61

losing party cannot, in order to secure a new trial, use the testimony of jurors to
impeach their verdict.").
17

Id. at 267.

s See id. at 267-68 (reasoning that if juror testimony were permitted, no verdict
would be safe).
'9

FED. R. EVID. 606(b).

See CBS Production Protocol, supra note 23, at *9 ("[T]he parties and their
attorneys could sign waivers in which they agree not to use the filming of deliberations
as a basis for appeal.").
6'One might question whether there is a difference between waiving the recording as the basis of an appeal and waiving juror misconduct that the record reveals as
the basis of an appeal. It is unclear, but the Comment assumes the parties waived not
only the former, but also the latter as well. The extent to which this type of perturbation of verdicts counsels against recording the jury is explored below. Seeinfra Part V.
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3. Respect forJurors' Privacy
The secrecy of jury deliberations can also be defended on the
ground of respect for jurors' privacy. In the course of deliberating,
jurors may reveal facts germane to the matter that would be embarrassing if made more broadly available. In fact, the courts' solicitude
for jurors is so great that courts restrict access to jurors even after the
trial is over.62 The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he State has
a[n] .. . interest in protecting juror privacy, even after the trial-to
encourage juror honesty in the future-that almost always will be
coextensive with the juror's own privacy interest."6 This, however, is
not a valid objection to the CBS project because the jurors must
consent to the recording. Consequently, the jurors are in no different position than anyone who consents to be televised in a sensitive
matter. Moreover, if the state's interest in the juror's privacy is simply
coextensive with the juror's own interest, the juror's consent is sufficient to counterbalance any state interest.
In summary, the mere fact that the CBS project involves a breach
of jury secrecy is not a valid objection to the project, because the
project adequately protects the interests that jury secrecy is meant to
protect. Nonetheless, the fact that the CBS project involves a televised breach ofjury secrecy is a more valid objection.
B. Arguments DirectedAgainst the CBS Project
Specically as a Television Project
Some critics have opposed the CBS project based on its special
character as a television broadcast, not merely as a breach of jury
secrecy. One critic points out that "[t]he very safeguards built into
the CBS documentary proposal.., ensure that media consciousness
62

See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983)

("[J]urors, even after completing their service, are entitled to privacy and to protecdon against harassment.").
In light of problems caused by the widespread desire to evade jury service, courts
are increasingly sensitive to the need to be solicitous of jurors. Recently, New York
and Arizona enacted path-breaking jury reforms, and many of the proposals are
targeted at protecting jurors' interests or providing for jurors' convenience. See
G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History ofJury Reform Efforts, 79JUDICATURE 216, 216
(1996) (noting increases in juror pay, provision ofjuror ombudsmen, and complaint
hotlines forjurors). For example, Arizona promulgated a proposedjuror bill of rights.
See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform:
JUDICATURE

The Arizona Experience, 79

280, 285 (1996) (quoting in full the proposed bill of rights for Arizona

jurors).
0 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 515 (1984).
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among the selected jurors will be high."6' Moreover, the justices
dissenting from Maine's administrative order pointed out that "[t]o
film a trial and the jury deliberations that follow when all the participants, judge, litigants, lawyers, and jurors have consented to the
"6
process cannot replicate a trial without the electronic intrusions. s
The dissenters concluded that "[w] hat is represented to be the jury
process will not be the jury process." 66 In short, these critics argue
that, over and above the change that observation in itself causes,
television cameras particularly intrude on the jury, not simply by
making the jury aware they are
under observation, but by heightening
67
their "media consciousness."

There is another, related criticism: Televising, as opposed to
more neutral observation, negatively impacts on the solemnity of
judicial proceedings. That is, televising court officers makes their
behavior tend toward spectacle. For example, during the legislative
debate in Maine, State Senator Sean Faircloth argued "that the CBS
taping might lead to opening jury deliberations to more entertainment-oriented coverage and that 'the glare of the TV cameras' might
distortjurors' judgment." 6
In fact, the first criticism is actually a form of this second criticism.
Heightening the jury's media consciousness is not objectionable on
the mere ground that a jury under observation-of whatever kindwill deliberate differently than it would in private; this would be a
mere rehash of the traditional criticism of any generic breach ofjury
secrecy. Rather, critics like the Maine dissenters and Professor Abraham Abramovsky object more particularly to the special character of
television recording.
These criticisms have some validity, though they are not decisive
in the debate over whether the CBS project should have been allowed. First, the jurors themselves stated that they were not affected
at all by the presence of the hidden CBS cameras. 69 Second, the CBS
production protocol provided a mechanism to correct for any distorAbramovsky, supra note 8.
6 Administrative Order, supra note 19, at *5 (Glassman & Rudman, JJ., dissenting).

Id. at *6 (Glassman & Rudman,JJ., dissenting).
67Abramovsky, supra note 8.

6sSenate Rejects Bill to Block Jury Taping,supra note 19. Senator Faircloth's concern
prompted the chauvinist retort: "'This is Maine, this is not L.A.'" Id. (quoting Sen.
Joan Pendexter).
69See CBS Reports, supranote 9, at 4-5 (noting jurors' responses to the presence of
cameras).
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tion created by the cameras. CBS included expert commentary on
the deliberations recorded"° and is making the full coverage of the
trials and deliberations available to legal scholars." Such measures
provide a mechanism by which the accuracy of the representation of
the jury may be critically appraised. Consequently, any observed
behavior attributable to the presence of television could have been
filtered through critical commentary so that the overall representation remained accurate.
More persuasive is the argument that projects like the CBS project diminish the solemnity of judicial proceedings] 2 This argument,
however, is far more effective in building the case against a general
practice of televising the jury; where the project in question is a onetime documentary effort, the argument loses some forcer2 Nonethe70

See CBS Production Protocol, supra note 23, at *6 (proposing to include

"deliberation by a panel of experts").
7 See CBS Reports, supra note 9, at 71 ("CBS News is joining the ABA
to make full
coverage of these trials and deliberations available to students, scholars and the legal
profession.").
72 Broadcast coverage of court proceedings involves "mischievous potentialities
for
intruding upon the detached atmosphere which should always surround the judicial
process," Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring), and
"introduces into the conduct of a... trial the element of professional 'showmanship,'"
id. at 591. While the holding of Estes has been expressly narrowed to its facts, so that
cameras in the courtroom are not per se unconstitutional, see Chandler v. Florida, 449
U.S. 560, 573-74 (1981) (holding that Estes "is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring.., television coverage in all cases and under all circumstances"),
the Chandler Court emphasized television's "'grave potentialities for distorting the
integrity of the judicial process.'" Id. at 572 (quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 592 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
73 The ChandlerCourt took notice that television technology had advanced to the
point that television coverage need not be, in any given instance, as intrusive as it was
in Estes. See Chandler,449 U.S. at 576 (noting that "many negative factors found in
Estes... are less substantial factors today than they were at that time"). The issue now
seems to be not whether broadcast coverage impairs the solemnity of a single trial
covered, but whether the general practice of television coverage so trivializes what is
recorded as to be undesirable. This issue arises in the context of cameras in the
courtroom (and the evaluation of the impact of the Court TV network on the judiciary
and the public) and in the context of debate over televised executions. One can see
this issue addressed, for example, in the authorities cited in Christo Lassiter, TVor Not
TV-That Is the Question, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 928, 990 n.329 (1996). See also
John D. Bessler, Televised Executions and the Constitution: Recognizing a FirstAmendment
Right of Access to State Executions, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 355, 357 n.3 (1993) (arguing that
television will "'trivialize executions-reduce them to the level of entertainment, to be
clicked on and off'" (quoting Anthony Lewis, Their Brutal Mirth, N.Y. TIMEs, May 20,
1991, at A15)); Nancy T. Gardner, Note, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelinesfor State
Criminal Trials,84 MICH. L. REV. 475, 494 n.108 (1985) (noting that Justice Douglas
opposed the extension of television into the courtroom because it would "transform a
trial into 'as much of a spectacle as if it were held in the Yankee Stadium or the
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less, one critic has suggested that the project is in fact an early misstep
on a slippery slope toward more regularly televised jury deliberations. 74 This argument is plausible, as is its underlying implication
that regular television broadcast of jury deliberations would deprive
the institution ofjury decisionmaking of its solemn dignity. To meet
this objection, proponents have offered the type of justifications of
press coverage that are typically invoked in press right-of-access
75
cases.
C. Justificationsfor Televising ajury Do Not Support the CBS Project
A close inspection of the Supreme Court's right-of-access jurisprudence reveals two things. First, justifications of the press's right of
access to judicial proceedings do not apply to the CBS project. Second, the impulse to inspect the jury, which was the impulse animating
the CBS project, is nonetheless a perfectly legitimate republican
impulse.
Strictly speaking, the CBS project does not present an issue of the
press's right of access to judicial proceedings. The question in the
CBS situation is whether the access that the court granted should
have been denied, whereas a right-of-access case raises the question
whether the access denied must constitutionally be granted. Nonetheless, a line of Supreme Court cases addressing the right of access 76
Roman Coliseum'" (quoting William 0. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 33
RocvMTN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1960))).
7' See Abramovsky, supra note 8 ("With a dual precedent set, it is no longer unthinkable that television coverage ofjury deliberations, especially in high-profile trials,
may some day become routine.").
75 See CBS Reports, supra note 9, at 3 (suggesting that CBS undertook the project
to
permit the public to consider whether "the road to justice lead[s] through the jury
room"); id. at 5 (statement of Arizona ChiefJustice Stanley Feldman) (stating that he
granted CBS permission to tape juries in order to permit the American people to
judge for themselves whether the jury system is a desirable one). For a list of leading
right-of-access cases, see infra note 76.
76 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (holding
unconstitutional a state court's closure of a 41-day preliminary hearing in a homicide
case); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984) (holding
unconstitutional a state court's closure of a six-week voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a state statute
requiring closure of trials of specified sexual offenses during the testimony of a minor
victim); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (holding unconstitutional a state court's absolute closure of a criminal trial).
While the Court's holdings all concerned criminal trials and closely related criminal proceedings, the doctrine led to an explosion in the lower courts, so that the right
of access "has been extended to almost every variety of legal proceeding or document,
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articulates the clearest justifications for press coverage of judicial
proceedings. Two justifications for press access to judicial proceedings emerge from these cases: Informing the public legitimates proceedings, and, in the case of criminal trials, provides "community
therapeutic value."7 Neither of these justifications suffices to justify
the CBS project.7
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, Chief Justice Burger ob-

served that access to governmental action helps legitimate that action:
"People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing."7 The precise ways in which informing the
public helps legitimate judicial proceedings include "assuring that
proceedings are conducted fairly; discouraging perjury, misconduct
of participants, and biased decisions;.., ensuring public confidence
in a trial's results through the appearance of fairness; [and] inspiring
confidence in judicial proceedings through education regarding the

but it has not been so extended beyond the courthouse." Eugene Cerruti, "Dancingin
the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L

REV. 237, 269 (1995).
Of course, many types of rights of different kinds of access have been litigated.
This Comment only deals with the question of the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of press or public access to judicial proceedings. In this Comment, the phrase
"right of access" is a shorthand for this particular type of right-of-access jurisprudence.
77 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570 (plurality opinion).
78 What transpires in this subpart is not a species of circular reasoning,
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. It may appear unfair to say: (1) the question
of the CBS project is not, strictly, a right-of-access question; (2) the reasons thatjustify
the press's right of access do not apply to the CBS project; (3) therefore, the CBS
project lacks any compelling justification. On first impression, this is to criticize one
activity (the CBS project) for lacking the justifications that validate some other kinds
of activity (general press access to judicial proceedings). However, no justifications
have been offered for the CBS project other than thejustifications typically offered for
the press's right of access generally. CBS has justified the project primarily as an
undertaking to inform the public and "answer the question, 'How do juries decide?'"
CBS Production Protocol, supra note 23, at *6; see alsoAdministrative Order, supra note
19, at *4 (Glassman & Rudman, JJ., dissenting) (discussing CBS's stated intent to
inform the public). The Arizona Supreme Court apparently adopted this rationale in
deciding to permit the CBS taping. See CBS Reports, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of
Arizona Chief Justice Stanley Feldman) ("'[I]f you think this is such a good system, .... the people of the United States ought to have it-a look at it and judge for
themselves.'").
Consequently, the real logic of the argument here could be stated as follows:
Whatever justifications may be offered for the CBS project, they cannot piggyback on
the right-of-access justifications, since those justifications presume general, ongoing,
and widespread press access. No otherjustifications, however, exist.
448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion).
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methods of government and judicial remedies." 0 Moreover, the
Court has acknowledged that "openness has what is sometimes deBy this, the Court
scribed as a 'community therapeutic value.''
means that public awareness that the law is functioning and being
enforced provides an outlet for the feelings of rage and indignation
that the commission of crimes engenders in the community; providing such an outlet can help defuse the community's impulse toward
extra-legal retaliation. 82
These two justifications of press access to public proceedings cannot justify the CBS project. The justifications themselves implicitly
presume the generality and continuity of access, which is lacking in
the CBS project. The functions of legitimation and community
therapeutic value presume that the judicial system itself is being
monitored, not that a few trials are being recorded. The fact that one
jury deliberates well would not serve to legitimate the institution of
the jury any more than the fact that one jury deliberates poorly would
form a valid basis for jury reform. Similarly, the recording of a single
jury does not promote such a general awareness of the law being
enforced as to provide community therapeutic value. In short, the
recording of the deliberations of one jury (or a few juries) does not
inform the public sufficiently about the nature and operation of the
institution to serve the interests that the right of access generally
serves. A closer inspection of the right-of-access issue, however, reveals the legitimacy of the impetus to inspect the jury underlying the
CBS project.s
The Supreme Court's right-of-access cases suggest a two-prong inquiry: In deciding whether a press right of access exists, a court looks
to whether there is "a tradition of openness ('history' prong),
and.., the instrumental utility of access to proper governmental
functioning ('functional' prong).""' This two-prong analysis operates
as a threshold inquiry:

8oIn re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571-72 (plurality opinion), and Press-EnterpriseCo., 464 U.S. at
508-09).
8,

Press-EnterpriseCo., 464 U.S. at 508-09 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at

570 (plurality opinion)).
82

See id. (discussing how open proceedings provide an outlet for the reactions of

the community to criminal acts).
'sSee supra note 78 (discussing the motivation of CBS in seeking access to jury

deliberations and that of the Arizona Supreme Court in granting access).
84 Cerruti, supra note 76, at 269.
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If the judicial proceeding passes these tests, a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches. The right may be overcome only if
"closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Moreover, the Supreme Court has never found a
value so compelling that it allows complete closure.8

Certainly, under this two-prong test, there is no right of access to jury
deliberations. The history prong of the test is not met because there
is no tradition of openness ofjury deliberations--quite the contrary. 816
Moreover, the functional prong is arguably not met. The presumption, unexamined and unsupported by empirical evidence, is that
openness ofjury deliberations would impede rather than enhance the
jury's function:
Although many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of
government operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted
openly. A classic example is that "the proper functioning of our sgrand
T
jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings."

The law has always presumed that the petit jury is also one of those
governmental institutions that operates better in the dark88 Consequently, it appears that the two-prong test derived from Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny decisively establishes that there is no right
of access to jury deliberations. 89
One critic, Eugene Cerruti, however, has suggested that the twoprong test is not the proper formulation of the right-of-access doctrine. Noting that the Supreme Court has only decided a narrow class
of right-of-access cases and has left the real development of the doc-

Mary McDevitt Gofen, Comment, The Right of Access to Child Custody and Dependency Cases, 62 U. CHi. L. REv. 857, 863 (1995) (quoting Press-EnterpriseCo., 464 U.S. at
510).
See Goldstein, supra note 7, at 295 ("For most of the petitjury's long history, and
certainly since the nineteenth century, the secrecy ofjury deliberations has been taken
for granted.... Prying into the jury's verdict, said Holdsworth, would have been as
'impious' as questioning the judgments of God." (quoting 1 WILuAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORYOF ENGLISH LAw 317 (7th ed. 1956))).

87 Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (quoting Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)).
See, e.g., In reGlobe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 95 (1st Cir. 1990) ("'Freedom of
debate might be stifled... ifjurors were made to feel that their arguments ... were to
be freely published to the world.'" (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13
(1933))).
"9The First Circuit has said as much in dictum: There is "clearly no public right of
access to the jurors' deliberations themselves.... Clearly, there is no ordinary public
right to 'know' what occurs in thejury room." Id. at 94.
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trine to the lower courts, 9° Cerruti claims that the two-prong test fails
to explain the doctrinal developments that have taken place: The test
"fails to justify the extraordinary extension of the right of access to
proceedings and documents with no real history of access and no real
utility to the governing process. Many courts have in fact quite explicitly forsaken the two-prong standard while at the same time extending
the right."9'
If Cerruti is correct, and there can be access to proceedings with
no real history of access and no real utility to the governing process,
the question of access to jury deliberations is no longer cut and dried.
The question of access, then, would have to be measured according to
some standard other than the two-prong test. According to Cerruti,
reality of
any statement of the doctrine of access should reflect the
92
the developments taking place in the lower federal courts.
The "actual touchstone for the new doctrine of access"93 is Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers.94 While that opinion
embodies aspects of the two-prong test, "the central premise of
Richmond Newspapers is that meaningful self-government requires an
informed electorate, and that where the representative government
itself maintains control of information essential to such an informed
public discourse, the government may be affirmatively required to
provide that information to the public."95 The right-of-access doc90See Cerruti, supra note 76, at 266-69 (discussing the lower court cases).
9' Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 318 (proposing a "revised reading of the right of access [that] is in
accord with the major holdings of the established case law").
9 Id. at 272.

9'Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, explained:
First, the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information .... Second, the value of access must be measured in
specifics .... [Wihat is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very process. To re-

solve the case before us, therefore, we must consult historical and current
practice with respect to open trials, and weigh the importance of public access
to the trial process itself.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan,J., concur-

ring in judgment).
9' Cerruti, supra note 76, at 239. In Richmond Newspapers,Justice Brennan further

emphasized that:
[T]he First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural

role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment. Implicit in this structural role is not only "the principle that de-

bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," but also
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trine, therefore, must be restated "to center upon the governmental
decision-making power of the Judiciary, rather than the functional
utility of access to a given judicial process."96 According to Cerruti,
"[t]he public has a right of access to all information, located within
the adjudicative process, relevant to an evaluation of the exercise or
performance of judicial authority over substantive matters of official
court business, unless there is a sufficiently compelling reason not to
so provide access."97
By Cerruti's standard, the question of whether access to jury deliberations is appropriate becomes a much closer question. Certainly,
the contents of those deliberations constitutes information located
within the adjudicative process. Moreover, that information is highly
relevant to an evaluation of the exercise of judicial authority over
substantive matters of official court business, since the evaluation of a
judgment entered on a verdict logically involves an evaluation of the
deliberative process that yields the verdict.
The key question, then, becomes whether there is a sufficiently
compelling reason not to provide access to jury deliberations. Such
compelling reasons may exist in the need to prevent the jury's debate
from being chilled by press observation, or in the need to preserve
the solemnity of jury deliberations by shielding them from press
observation. 98 However that may be, Cerruti's analysis brings into
relief the crucial issue: The motivation for inspecting the jury, which
underlies the CBS project and is entirely legitimate, is not a claim for
a negative liberty-that is, to be free of government restraint in the
free flow of communication between broadcaster and audience.
Rather, the motivation is a strong claim that the government has an
affirmative obligation to give an account of its activities to the people.
However wrong it may be to permit CBS to televise ajury, the motivation to monitor the jury is a legitimate republican, notjust libertarian,

the antecedent assumption that valuable public debate-as well as other civic
behavior-must be informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive,
and thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but also for the
indispensable conditions of meaningful communication.
448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted)
(footnote omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964)).
Cerruti, supra note 76, at 295.
9' Id. at 295-96.
9See supra Part II.A-B.

1997]

LIFTING THE CLOAK OFJURYSECRECY

impulse. 9 The proposal to transcribe jury deliberations as part of the
trial record seeks to give that republican impulse its due, without
sacrificing either the dignity of the jury or the benefits ofjury privacy.
In summary, critics have attacked the CBS project based on both
its generic character as a breach ofjury secrecy and its special character as a televised intrusion on the jury. The latter arguments are
slightly stronger than the former. Moreover, the justifications that
might be offered for televising the jury cannot justify a one-time
project like the CBS project. Nonetheless, by refusing to acknowledge the legitimate motivations behind public efforts to observe the
jury, critics have failed to hit upon the best argument against the CBS
project.
The strongest argument admits that the jury should be observed
but denies that television broadcast of deliberations is the proper
means of observation. Consequently, the most serious criticism of the
CBS project is not the "slippery slope" argument that the project is
simply the first of many. Rather, the best argument against the project is that it is merely an isolated instance, of observation of a jury,
when what is needed is continual monitoring of all juries.
III.

DESIRABILITY OF AN ALTERNATIVE:

COURT-RECORDED

JURY DELIBERATIONS

Close analysis of the CBS project and the debate surrounding it
reveals the need for the recognition of the validity of the impulse that
lies behind that project: an impulse to provide closer public monitoring of the jury system. ' °0 By the same token, the critics' concerns
about a televised intrusion on the jury appear valid.'0 ' Consequently,
a manner of monitoring the jury that would render the jury more
accountable to the public, but that would intrude on the jury's privacy
less than a television broadcast of deliberations, seems desirable.
Such an alternative is the transcription ofjury deliberations as part of
the ordinary trial record, not for the purpose of general public distribution, but for the purpose of limited judicial review. To see more

9' Cf Cerruti, supra note 76, at 283 ("Richmond Newspapers does not vindicate a
freedom of speech so much as it does a freedom of self-rule."); id. at 240 ("It was the
very exhaustion of the traditional libertarian paradigm of freedom, and its inability to

secure a proactive self-government against the informational hegemony of the modem state, that forced the Court to reach beyond, but not to break, that mold.").
"0 Seesupra PartII.C.
.0 See supra Part II.B.
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precisely how desirable this alternative is, one must revisit the criticism of absolute jury secrecy.
A. Criticism ofJuty Secrecy
There are two problems with the secrecy of the American jury.
is inconsistent with the overall
secrecy
First, theou
spirt
judcia
o of jury deliberations
,.
102
Second, jury secrecy as currently
spirit of ourjudicial proceedings.
practiced (namely, near-absolute secrecy) is not tailored narrowly
enough.0 3 In short, jury secrecy as practiced is so broad that the
public's interest in supervised government processes is insufficiently
protected. This breadth is unnecessary; jury secrecy could be more
narrowly tailored without disserving the ends that ordinarily justify it.
1. Secret Deliberations Are Not Formally Rational
Judicial proceedings require formal rationality. That is to say, the
form in which the proceedings take place must reflect their rationalist
substance. The form of the proceedings must reflect the proceedings' single-minded devotion to the efficient accomplishment of the
common end ofjustice: the resolution of disputes according to rules
of general applicability.' 4 To illustrate and defend this claim, one
might observe that our law of procedure and evidence manifests this
devotion to formal rationality.
The federal rules of procedure are to be interpreted and administered so as to secure fair resolutions efficiently.0 5 Rules of pleading
are liberal and intended to prevent technicalities from impeding the
adjudication of controversies on the merits. 16 Information is presumptively discoverable, affording parties every opportunity to sub-

12 See infra Part III.A.1.

See infra Part III.A.2.
,o4 For the purposes of this discussion, this will be the definition of formal rationality. On formal, as opposed to substantive, rationality, see FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 298-99 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Galaxy Books 1958)
(1946). On the import of formal rationality in legal bureaucracy, see id. at 216-21.
'0- See FED. IL CIV. P. 1 (stating that rules "shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 2 (stating that rules "shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay").
'0 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.8, at 22 (4th ed. 1992)
(noting that the principal features of the federal rules "are integrated to promote the
decision of disputes on their merits").
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stantiate claims and defenses. 7 Similarly, the Federal Rules of Evidence "shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."03 Evidence must
be logically relevant to be admissible.' 9 Moreover, evidence that is
logically relevant may be excluded if it is likely to lead to a result
based on passion or prejudice rather than reason." ° The furtherance
of these ends is committed to the supervisory authority of the court,
and the conduct of court officers can be tightly reined to promote
these ends."'
Once the jury has retired, however, the jury's conduct is completely out of the court's control. If a drunken and inattentive jury
convicts a man of a crime, that decision is unreviewable-at least, the
jurors may not be summoned to answer for their conduct and verdict.
There is something comically inconsistent about the scrupulous observation of proper procedure and formal proof during the
trial, and the final submission of the cause to a deliberative body that
operates free of all rational constraint with a request that it return a
verdict unjustified by reasons. A trial would have more rational consistency if the jury were as subject to the court's supervisory control
during the weighing of Vvidence as it is during the reception of evidence. Transcription of deliberations for the purpose of judicial
review would provide the requisite control.

107

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating that parties may have discovery of any

relevant matter not privileged, and that matter need not be admissible if "reasonably
calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence").
"S FED. R. EVID. 102.
"9 See FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible.... Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.").
,,0 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 ("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.").
,,i See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (permitting sanction of attorneys for frivolous,
wasteful, or dilatory tactics); FED. R. EVID. 105 (permitting a court to attempt to restrict
ajury's consideration of admitted evidence).
112 See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 122-25 (1987)
(holding that the
legislative history of rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence demonstrates that
Congress intended that jurors not be questioned about possible intoxication during
deliberation).
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2. Jury Secrecy Is Not Tailored Narrowly Enough
Jury secrecy as practiced is so broad that it infringes on other legitimate public interests-primarily the public's interest in the accountability of government decisionmakers. The degree of jury
secrecy that is justifiable could be achieved by less extreme means,
permitting protection of the legitimate interests currently infringed.
a. Near-AbsoluteJury Secrecy, as Currently Practiced,Infringes on Other
Legitimate PublicInterests

Jury secrecy is contrary to the principle, operative in the Supreme
Court's right-of-access jurisprudence, that "the Judicial Branch [is] a
governing agency subject to the sovereign limitations of the selfgoverning electorate."113 Perhaps this principle does not justify press
access to jury deliberations, 4 but it recommends that, in the absence
of press access, the jury still be monitored. In short, even if we assume that some governmental processes operate better out of the
public eye,"s it does not follow that those processes must be completely unsupervised and unreviewable. To the contrary, where we
permit government activity to carry on in secret, we normally insist on
intra-governmental oversight. 16
It is not clear that limited court supervision of jury deliberations
and the requirement of a modicum of reasoned justification of the
jury's decision will frustrate the operation of the jury as an institution.117 Tailoring jury secrecy more narrowly, by subjecting it to limited judicial review, would infringe less on the public interests of
legitimation and community therapeutic value that openness generally promotes than does the current degree of secrecy.1 Moreover,
the extreme degree of secrecy that currently protects jury deliberations arguably diminishes the legitimacy of the jury.

Cerruti, supranote 76, at 301.
See supra Part II.C.
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (recognizing
that "some governmental operations would be totally frustrated if conducted openly").
n6 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that many governmental functions require secrecy that is subject to the
appropriate legislative oversight).
117 See Goldstein, supra note 7, at 313 n.75 (noting the absence
of any'evidence on
the question of the "effect on a group (assured of privacy while it performs the group
function) of an awareness that its activities will be disclosed afterwards").
See supra Part II.C.
11

"4
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The legitimacy of the jury is under attack. Certainly, criticism of
the jury as an institution is not new: "[V]irtually from its inception,
[the jury] has been the subject of deep controversy, attracting at once
the most extravagant praise and the most harsh criticism.""9 Nonetheless, there have been recent cases where a large segment of the
national population has observed the trial and evidence almost as
closely as the jury, and there has been widespread disagreement with
the verdicts rendered.2 2 This trend is likely to continue since the
televising of trials gives every indication of increasing rather than
abating.
As long as juries render verdicts with which a public that
has seen and heard the evidence disagrees, dissatisfaction with juries
that operate free of the rational restraints of the judicial process is
likely to abide. Arguably, the public will more readily tolerate jury
verdicts that are subject to at least some critical review (such as judi119KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 15, at 4; see also Hearings, supra note 13, at 63

(memorandum submitted by Harry Kalven, Jr.) ("[T]he debate [over the jury system]
has been going on for a long time (at least since 1780) and the arguments which were
advanced pro and con haven't changed much in the interim. Nor, contrary to my first
impression, does there seem to be any particular period in which the debate grows
hotter or colder. It has always been a hot debate.").
120 The criminal trial of O.J. Simpson is the most
striking and most recent example
of this social problem. A broad segment of the population watched the entire trial
almost as closely as the jury did, and a significant percentage of the population disagrees with the verdict rendered. See Howard Goldberg, Black-White Gap over O.J.'s Guilt
Narrows, AP, Jan. 22, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 4852830 (noting that 53% of Americans-59% white and 16% black-still disagreed with the acquittal of O.J. Simpson).
The most serious instance of this social problem was the criminal trial of the
officers accused of beating Rodney King. In that case, a significant segment of the
population felt that the admitted evidence they had seen with their own eyes (the
videotape) spoke clearly to the defendants' guilt, and yet the jury acquitted with no
justification or explanation offered. Indignation over justice denied, and the breakdown of the "community therapeutic" function due to jury secrecy, led to widespread
rioting. See Views on the King Verdict, WASH. POST, May 3, 1992, atA26 (noting that 68%
of all Americans disagreed with the verdict that preceded the L.A. riots); cf Carla
Rivera, Majority Say Denny Verdicts Too Lenient, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al (reporting that 82% of Angelenos disagreed with the verdict in the King beating case and that
76% were angered by it, and also noting widespread disagreement with verdicts in the
trial of the defendants charged with the videotaped beating of a motorist during the
L.A. riots, with 67% of Angelenos thinking that the jury was motivated by fear, 52%
disapproving of the jury's handling of the case, and 63% saying that they had little
confidence in thejury system).
. See, e.g., HarveyJ. Sepler, Where Do We Stand on Cameras in the Courtroom?, FLA.
B.J.,June 1996, at 113, 113 ("[T]here is every reason to believe that with the growing
public interest in the trial process, this type of [electronic media] coverage will burgeon."); The Appearance ofJustice: Juries,Judges and the Media Transcript,86J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1096, 1099 (1996) (statement of Leslie Abramson) ("The television of
trials, of many, many trials every year, is guaranteed.").
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cially reviewed deliberation transcripts) in contrast to current verdicts, which are not only kept from public view, but are also not reviewable by any public official.
b. Near-AbsoluteJuly Secrecy, as Currently Practiced,Is More Extreme Than
Required by the Ends ThatJustify It
Jury secrecy is ordinarily justified by the justice system's interest in

promoting frank communication or free debate among jurors, protecting juror privacy, and promoting the stability of verdicts.ln The
ordinary rule of absolute jury secrecy, however, goes too far. These
legitimate interests could be adequately protected by a less absolute
form of jury secrecy which allows the transcription of jury deliberations forjudicial review.
There is no evidence that disclosure of the contents ofjury deliberations after they are completed would affect those deliberations in
any way. 124 Assuming, however, that merely transcribing deliberations
might chill the jurors' discussion, a rule of juror secrecy, as opposed
to jury secrecy, would serve the end of frankness just as well as the
current rule ofjury secrecy.'25 That is to say, as long as the identity of
individual jurors is kept secret, there is no reason to think that recording of their deliberations would have a chilling effect on individual jurors.
Similarly, a policy of juror secrecy rather than jury secrecy would
adequately protect jurors' privacy. While jurors may indeed feel the
See supraPart II.A.
In this section, only the interests of juror frankness and juror privacy are
discussed. It is argued that transcribing jury deliberations will not seriously interfere
with any legitimate public interest in the finality of verdicts, since the harmless-error
standard will protect that interest independently of any rule of secrecy. This argument, however, is addressed in the section on the nature and scope of review ofjury
deliberations. See infraPart V.
124 See supra note 117.
12
'2

'25Distinguishing

between the jury and the jurors is crucial for the analysis of

several problems, not just this problem of secrecy. The distinction has been highlighted for purposes of social-scientific study ofjury decisionmaking, seeJeffrey Kerwin
& David P, Shaffer, MockJurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role of Deliberationsin Reactions to
Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALrIy & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 159-61 (1994)

(arguing that inferences of influences on jury behavior from observations of influences on juror behavior may be invalid), and of systematization of the Supreme
Court's interpretations of the impartiality mandate of the Sixth Amendment and the
Due Process Clauses, see generally Scott W. Howe,JurorNeutrality oran ImpartialityArray?:
A Structural Theory of the ImpartialJuryMandat 70NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1179-219
(1995) (exploring whether a constitutionally impartial jury means more than a group

of impartialjurors).
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need to touch on private matters while deliberating, they also feel this
need during voir dire. In that context:
[T]he constitutionally preferable method for reconciling the First
Amendment interests of the public and press with the legitimate privacy
interests of jurors and the interests of defendants in fair trials is to redact transcripts in such a way as to preserve the anonymity of jurors
while disclosing the substance of their responses.126
As the jurors remain strangers to one another, one might infer that
they make whatever sensitive statements that are necessary in a rather
guarded way. There is no reason to think that jurors make statements
that, divorced from any identifiable speaker, are so private that the
fact of transcription for judicial review would chill the speaker. The
balance of public interests and juror interests in the context of deliberations, as in the context of voir dire, favors transcription of juror
statements in a way that preserves juror anonymity.
B. PracticalConsiderationsin RecordingJuryDeliberations
forJudicialReview
The rule of absolute jury secrecy should be amended, and jury deliberations should be transcribed as part of the trial record, permitting a limited judicial review. Such a practice would have three main
benefits. First, the practice would legitimate jury deliberations as a
government proceeding in all the ways that more public inquiries
into jury deliberations (for instance, post-verdict interviews or the
CBS project) claim to do,1 7 without the attendant encroachments on
juror privacy, trial solemnity, and juror frankness. Second, the practice would integrate jury deliberations more into the overall trial
process, making the trial a more unified, consistently rational proceeding. This would rationalize the overall procedure by eliminating
the disjunction between the rationalized trial phase and the oracular
delivery of the verdict. 28 Third, the practice would arguably improve

2 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 520 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in judgment).
127 This serves the goal of rendering the jury accountable to the public, see Note,

supra note 5, at 893 (noting the view that the jury should be scrutinized like any public
agency), "educat[ing] the public, restrain[ing] ... the abuse of governmental power,
and maintain [ing] public confidence in our legal system," Goldstein, supra note 7, at
302.
1'2 Edson R. Sunderland first compared modern jury secrecy to ancient oracles:
The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle at Delphi. Both stand on the same
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the results ofjury trials by impressing more on the jurors their role as
officers of the court and by permitting courts to overturn verdicts
improperly derived.'29
Admittedly, there are costs associated with such a modification of
jury secrecy. Judicial review will result in less finality for verdicts and
will increase demand on judicial resources. As a body of common law
concerning judicial review develops, however, those costs will probably decrease as the class of colorable attacks on verdicts becomes
more sharply defined. 3
However, substantial benefits will also be gained from the experiment: primarily, increased understanding of how the jury operates and increased public faith in judicial proceedings. Some benefits, such as increased knowledge, will accrue to other jurisdictions in
addition to the jurisdiction that undertakes the experiment. Therefore, one might expect each state to be reluctant to initiate such an
experiment, instead waiting to free-ride on another state's experiment. The federal government plays an important part in solving
such collective-action problems among the states.' 3' More-over, the
federal courts play a leading role in reforming and modernizing
judicial procedure.
For these reasons, the experiment
of recording
33
begin in the federal courts.
should
jury deliberations
foundation-a presumption of wisdom. The court protects the jury from all
investigation and inquiry as fully as the temple authorities protected the
priestess who spoke to the suppliant votary at the shrine.
Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920). While
Sunderland thought it nonetheless quite proper that the court should not permit
jurors to testify "as to how they compounded their verdict," id., preferring instead to
do away with the general verdict altogether, see id. at 258, 266 (arguing that a special
verdict system would improve jury decisions), Sunderland's "provocative language
ha[s] much farther-reaching implications," Note, supra note 5, at 893 n.46.
'2' See Sunderland, supra note 128, at 259 (suggesting that lifting the cloak ofjury
secrecy would inculcate the proper, public-spirited sense of responsibility in jurors).
"30 See infra Part V (discussing how the harmless-error doctrine will protect adequately the interests ofjudicial economy).
131 In the regulatory field, it is recognized that
the federal government plays an
important role in helping states overcome 'prisoners' dilemmas' like the free-rider
problem. SeeJerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in
THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY 111, 117 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds.,
1984) (illustrating the prisoner's dilemma).

'S'See,

e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING

AND PROCEDURE 30 (7th ed. 1994) (noting that many states have followed the federal
courts' lead by adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in whole or in substantial
part).
" There is a possible contrary argument. One of the great benefits of our federal
system is that individual states can experiment with novel procedures adapted to
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Transcription of jury deliberations should continue to promote,
as much as possible, the interests that jury secrecy has always promoted.'s Nonetheless, the transcript must be made in a way that
provides for meaningful judicial review. For there to be meaningful
review, there must be transcription of deliberations in every case
tried, despite the nonassent, or even the affirmative objection, of a
party, and despite the nonassent of the jurors.
Transcription of deliberations should be undertaken with all due
respect for juror (as opposed to jury) privacy. Nonetheless, to provide for meaningful judicial review, the transcript must reflect continuity in individual jurors' remarks. Although jurors should remair
anonymous, it will be important that readers be able to ascertain
whether two statements in the transcript were made by the same
juror. Consequently, there must be some identification-however
anonymous-of each juror. Therefore, the transcript should identify
jurors only by randomly assigned number, not by name.'35
Transcription should impede as little as possible the freedom of
the jurors' debate. The transcription method, therefore, should be
unobtrusive so as to avoid interrupting their deliberations or impressing unduly on the jurors' minds the fact of recording.3 6 Moreover,
changing needs without committing the entire country to the experiment, but permitting the other states to learn from each other's experience. Since transcription ofjury
deliberations represents a significant departure from current common-law trial
practice, one might argue that transcription is a prime candidate for experimentation
at the state, rather than the federal, level.
For analytical purposes, it is preferable to consider reform at the federal level,
where the procedure's strictest obstacles exist. Should an individual state undertake
such a reform, it will still benefit from this analysis, since state law will initially be
either less of an obstacle than federal law, or will be, for all relevant purposes, identical
to federal law. By analyzing the problem at the federal level, this Comment does not
leave unexplored any significant legal problems that might face reformers in any
jurisdiction, state or federal.
'3' Those interests are, of course,juror privacy, frankness of debate, and stability of
verdicts. The impact of transcription on the last of these three interests is a special
problem addressed in Part V of this Comment.
135This is essentially a technique for preserving juror, as opposed to jury,
secrecy,
and is consistent with Justice Marshall's suggestion regarding the privacy issues in the
related area of voir dire responses. SeePress-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 520 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that voir dire transcripts should be made public with juror identity withheld).
'6jury transcription involves technical problems beyond the scope of this Comment. How exactly the jury room should be wired is not considered. A few remarks,
however, are warranted. The means of recording must permit identification ofjurors.
This may require the presence of a stenographer in the jury room. The preferable
method, however, is to make a transcript from tape recordings; it is cheaper as well as
less intrusive. Recording devices should be as inconspicuous as possible. In address-
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the transcript should be protected by the court, and the court should
retain the power to deny a party access to the transcript on a finding
that juror harassment
or other injury to the administration of justice
37
result.
would
Of course, not everything that is desirable or expeditious is legal.
Accordingly, this Comment next examines the legality of recording
jury deliberations with the knowledge, but without the consent, of the
parties and the jury.
IV.

LEGALITY OF COURT-RECORDEDJURY DELIBERATIONS

While any type of recording ofjury deliberations is statutorily proscribed in the
federal courts1s and proscribed or restricted in some
state courts, 3 9 the Constitution does not require such secrecy. This

ing the technical problems of recording the jury, one should bear in mind the possibility that the jury will often not deliberate as a whole but will break up into smaller
groups, all of which will have to be recorded. For example, imagine a jury of twelve
with three holdouts; in all likelihood, the jury would not deliberate as one body, but
would break up into three groups, with three members of the majority "working" each
of the holdouts. I am indebted to Louis Ruprecht, Esq., for this last caveat.
"' Juror safety and the integrity of the judicial system are crucial concerns ofjury
secrecy, sometimesjustifyingjuror anonymity or the closure of voir dire. SeeGoldstein,
supra note 7, at 302-03 (discussing cases restricting press access to jurors or their
identities during voir dire and trial, and after trial).
'3' See 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1994) (outlawing recording and listening to jury delibera-

tions).
s9 Nine states proscribe the recording ofjury deliberations, by expressly prohibiting recording of deliberations, see ALA. CODE § 13A-10-130(a) (5) (1994); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 710-1077(1)(f) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.120b (West 1991), by
prohibiting listening to deliberations, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5103 (West 1983),
by prohibiting either recording or listening, see 705 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1-1 (a)
(West Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:129.2(1) (West 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-09-05(1) (a) (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 588 (1983), or by prohibiting installing
or causing to be installed a recording device in the jury room, see VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-468 (Michie 1996). Three other states require court authorization for any recording or interception ofjury deliberations. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.09 (West 1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-360 (Law Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-35A-20(3),
-21(5) (Michie 1988).
Texas would prohibit a stenographer from being in the jury room but would not
necessarily prohibit recording the jury's deliberations. See TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN.
§ 36.22 (West 1981) (stating that no person "shall be permitted to be with the jury"
while it is deliberating). Similarly, Mississippi prohibits any "court officer" from being
in the jury room "save by order of the court." MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-57 (1994).
Federal law prohibits electronic interception of any oral communications where
the participants have a justifiable expectation of privacy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994)
(prohibiting interception of oral communications); id. § 2510(2) (defining oral
communications to include only communication under which the parties have a
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Part demonstrates the constitutional permissibility of recording jury
deliberations in both criminal and civil cases, and then suggests
amendments to the statutes and rules that bar such recording.
A. ConstitutionalIssues
1. Criminal Trials
Article III of the Constitution provides in pertinent part that
"[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be
byJury,"40 and the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of14the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed. 1
The Sixth Amendment guarantee is fully incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore, the right to a criminal jury
trial applies identically in state-court and federal-court prosecutions. 2
However, the Sixth Amendment guarantee does not include all the
historical incidents of the common-law jury; courts can "turn[] to
other than purely historical considerations to determine which features of the jury system, as it existed at common law, were preserved

justifiable expectation that the communication is not subject to interception). Federal
law, therefore, requires that the jurors know that they are being recorded.
One state requires the jurors' consent to any recording in addition to the jurors'
knowledge. See CAL PENAL CODE § 167 (West 1988). Another state requires either
knowledge or consent, seeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-227.2 (1996), though it is doubtful that
recording a juror without the juror's knowledge but with some kind of constructive
consent would comport with the federal wiretap statute. Several states have wiretapping statutes that either mirror the federal law or additionally apply specifically to
juries, but these state statutes do not add any obstacle to jury recording beyond the
knowledge requirement of federal law. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney
1989) (prohibiting mechanically overhearing a conversation); id. § 250.00 (permitting
mechanical overhearing with consent of at least one party to a conversation).
In summary, nine states (Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) directly prohibit recording jury
deliberations, in a fashion analogous to the federal prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1508.
Six other states (California, Minnesota, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Texas) impose some restriction on the recording of jury deliberations beyond the
restriction imposed by the federal wiretapping statute.
'40
U.S. CONST. arL III, § 2, cl. 3.
.4Id. amend. VI.
142 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("Because we believe that
trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right ofjury trial in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee.").
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in the Constitution. The relevant inquiry... must be the function

that the particular
feature performs and its relation to the purposes of
14
the jury trial."
The relation of the function ofjury secrecy to the purpose of the
criminal jury is such that transcription of jury deliberations for purposes ofjudicial review does not offend the Constitution.
Since "[tlhe purpose of the jury trial ... is to prevent oppression

by the Government," the essence of a criminal jury "lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation
and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination
of guilt or innocence." 144 The relationship of jury secrecy's function

to this purpose does not require a ban on transcribing jury deliberations.

The functions ofjury secrecy are to promote frankness injury deliberation, to promote stability of verdicts, and to respect juror privacy.1'5 While the first and third functions promote the purposes of
the criminal jury identified in Williams, the limited inspection ofjury
deliberations advocated here would not frustrate those purposes. Jury
deliberations can be transcribed in such a way as to have a minimal4
impact on frankness in juror discussions and on juror privacy.'
Moreover, the second function arguably frustrates the purposes identified in Williams as much as it promotes them. As Tanner v. United
StateS1 47 illustrates, the premium placed on verdict stability prohibits
evidence tending to show that jurors were incapable of interposing
their common sense between the accused and the state. Judicial
review would lessen this problem by permitting a court to determine
whether the jury adequately performed its essential function.
Finally, court transcription of jury deliberations would actually
advance, rather than frustrate, one of the purposes of trial by jury that
the Williams Court identified: promotion of a shared sense of respon-

'ISWilliams

v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1970) (holding that the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments do not require that criminal juries consist of twelve jurors);
see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require a unanimous verdict).
'
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100.
14 See supra Part
II.A.
146 See supra Part III.A.2.b.
IV 483 U.S. 107 (1987); see supra note 112 and
accompanying text (discussing
Tanner).
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sibility in the rendition of a verdict. 11 With the jury's verdict essentially unreviewable as it is now, the verdict appears very much the
product of just twelve (or fewer) people. 4 1 Consequently, when the
community wishes to do so, it can easily evade responsibility for the
verdict it renders through the jury. This flies in the face of the promotion of shared responsibility that the Williams Court identified as a
leading purpose of trial by jury.
The function ofjury secrecy-especially the absolute secrecy that
would bar a court transcription or review of the deliberations-is not
unequivocally wedded to the purposes of the criminal jury trial.
Moreover, the balance of considerations suggests that the purposes of
the jury trial might be better promoted through limited judicial
review of deliberations. Accordingly, the Constitution does not prohibit court transcription ofjury deliberations.
The constitutional question that transcription presents is whether
the presence of a silent, unobtrusive observer (for example, a stenographer, a tape recorder, or a video camera) in the jury room violates
the right to ajury trial. Some commentators have suggested that the
mere presence of a stranger in the jury room violates a party's right to
ajury trial'5 0 Significant precedents suggest that this view is mistaken.
The issue of the silent observer typically arises in the federal
courts when an alternate juror is purposely or inadvertently permitted
The Supreme Court has never
to sit in on jury deliberations.'
"

See Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (emphasizing "the community participation and

shared responsibility" of the jurors in their "determination of guilt or innocence").
"9 The

broad-based dissatisfaction with the verdicts in the Simpson case and the

Rodney King beating case involved widespread sentiment that these were not "our"
verdicts. The "we" in question-the community that renders the verdict through the

jury-aspires to be the American society as a whole. The reality, however, at least in
the cases cited, appears to be profoundly divided along racial lines. See supra note 120
(citing sources showing racial divide over verdicts in Simpson, Denny, and L.A. police
officer trials). There is no reason to think that inspection of deliberations will close
this divide. It is, however, morally improper and politically imprudent to purchase the

appearance of racial neutrality in the administration ofjustice by turning a blind eye
to the possibility of racism in the jury room.
ISO
See Abramovsky, supra note 8 ("[T]he presence of cameras in the jury room
would seem at least as likely to 'inhibit or influence the jury by their [very] presence'
as the presence of court officers or bailiffs." (second alteration in original with brackets added) (quoting People v. Guzman, 555 N.E.2d 259, 263 (N.Y. 1990))); Note, supra
note 5, at 897 ("Deliberative secrecy... is of constitutional dimension.").
...
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993) (holding that no plainerror reversal was warranted where alternate jurors were permitted to attend deliberations, but were not permitted to participate, and the defendant failed to show prejudice);Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981) (declining to set aside

a verdict reached in the presence of an alternate juror); United States v. Virginia
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squarely addressed this issue in constitutional terms, but the Court
did consider the
issue on plain- and harmless-error grounds in United
152
States v. Olano.

In that case, the district court permitted two alternates to attend
jury deliberations under instructions not to participate. 53 Defendants
forfeited any claim of error, and the court of appeals therefore reviewed the alleged error under the plain-error standard of Federal
Rule of Crininal Procedure 52(b)."" The court of appeals reversed
the defendants' convictions, finding that the attendance of the alternates constituted plain error, and that the error was "inherently
prejudicial." 5 The Court granted certiorari "to clarify the standard
for 'plain error' review... under Rule 52(b) ."ms The Court then
reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that the presence of alternate
jurors during deliberations was not inherently prejudicial or reversible per se.157

Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964) (vacatingjudgment entered on a verdict
reached in the presence of an alternate juror). The latter two cases are discussed by
Professor Abramovsky. SeeAbramovsky, supra note 8.
132 507 U.S. at 737. The Court compared the analysis used when an alternate is
present to that used in other "intrusion" cases decided by the Court. See id. at 737-39
(discussing several intrusion cases). The Court, while expressly not reaching the
constitutional questions, see id. at 739 ("[T]he issue here is whether the alternates'
presence sufficed to establish remedial authority under Rule 52(b), not whether it
violated the Sixth Amendment or Due Process Clause ... ."), made it clear that the
Due Process Clause was not violated, see id. at 738 (noting that due process does not
require a new trial when a jury is in a potentially compromising position, but merely
requires ajury willing to decide the case solely on the evidence and ajudge vigilant
against prejudicial occurrences (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982))),
and suggested that there might have been no constitutional violation, see id. at 737
(holding that the presence of alternates is not an error "that 'affect[s] substantial
rights' independent of its prejudicial impact" (alteration in original)), though the
Court expressly declined to consider whether a constitutional violation might affect
substantial rights regardless of prejudice, see id. at 735, 739 (noting that some errors
may deprive defendants of basic protection necessary for the functioning of the trial as
a fair procedure "regardless of their effects on the outcome," but noting that this
question was not presented).
13 See id. at 729 ("' [Wlhat we would like to do in this case is have all of you go back
so that even the alternates can be there for the deliberations, but according to the law,
the alternates must not participate in the deliberations.'" (quoting the district court's
instructions)).
'5 See id. at 730 ("Because respondents had not objected to the alternates' presence, the court applied a 'plain error' standard under Rule 52(b).").
133 Id.
(citing United States v. Olano, 934 F.2d 1425, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991)).
16 Id. at 731.
157 See id. at 741 ("Because the conceded error in this case did not 'affect substantial rights,' the Court of Appeals had no authority to correct it.").
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The Court decided Olano on the assumption that the alternates'
attendance at deliberation constituted plain error. ss The Court's
analysis turned on whether reversal was warranted under Rule 52 (b),
not on whether the defendants' Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights
were violated. 9 Consequently, the constitutional question remains
open, technically, in the case where the jury's deliberations are transcribed over the defendant's express objection. Nonetheless, in an
opinion that more squarely addresses the constitutional question
involved, the Seventh Circuit implied that routine transcription of
jury deliberations would be constitutionally permissible.'60
In Johnson v. Duckworth, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal
of a habeas corpus petition by the District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana. 6 The petitioner claimed that the state trial court
violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by instructing
an "alternate juror to attend, but not participate in, the jury's deliberations." 162 As the petitioner had objected to the alternate juror's
attendance, the reviewing court found a constitutional question "of
first impression" presentedis

On the one hand, the court recognized that "if an intrusion into
the jury's privacy has, or is likely to have, the effect of stifling [free]
debate, the defendant's right to trial by jury may well have been
violated."' 64. On the other hand, the court emphasized that "jury
"5 See id. at 737 (assuming without deciding, due to a government concession, that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c) is nonwaivable, and analyzing deviation
from the rule under the plain-error standards of Rule 52(b)).
' See id. at 739 (noting that the issue was whether the alternates' presence
"sufficed to establish remedial authority under Rule 52(b)").
160 SeeJohnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that"jury
privacy is not a constitutional end in itself; it is rather, a means of ensuring the integrity of the jury trial"); cf Olano, 507 U.S. at 737-38 (suggesting that shielding the jury
from improper influence is the primary-and possibly the exclusive-purpose ofjury
secrecy).
161 johnson, 650 F.2d at
123.
162 Id.

'6 IM.at 124. Obviously, any state procedural irregularity in permitting the alternate to deliberate was not before the federal court on petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (providing that such petitions may only be entertained on the ground of alleged violations of federal law).
The elimination of this procedural issue serves to distill the problem to its constitutional essence in a way that is not possible when federal jury deliberation is involved.
In the federal court, the presence of an alternate will always involve a deviation from
Rule 24(c); therefore, there will always be a procedural ground of error, eliminating
the need to reach a question of constitutional error.
"AJohnson, 650 F.2d at 125.

256

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 146:217

privacy is not a constitutional end in itself; it is, rather, a means of
ensuring the integrity of the jury trial."'65 In fact, the court noted that
sometimes "jury privacy must be breached in the name of protecting
the defendant's right to ajury trial."'6 The court then reasoned that
the proper approach to the constitutional question presented was to
determine whether the alternate's presence is "the sort of invasion of
the jury's privacy that will tend to stifle the jury's
debate, thus endan67
gering the defendant's right to trial by jury.",
In carrying out its analysis, the Johnson court not only looked to
whether the intrusion was likely to stifle free debate among the jurors,
but also weighed the state's purpose in breaching jury secrecy.ta In
doing so, the court followed the lead of the Supreme Court's decision
in Ballew v. Georgia.

In Ballew, the Court posed the question of whether a state criminal jury of fewer than six persons "inhibits the functioning of the jury
as an institution to a significant degree, and, if so, whether any state
interest counterbalances and justifies the disruption so as to preserve
its constitutionality." 70 The Court held that the functioning of a
criminal jury is impaired to a constitutional degree by a reduction in
size below six. 71

The Court further found that Georgia "offered little

or no justification for its reduction [of the jury] to five members"'7
and reversed the conviction. 73
No court has addressed the precise question regarding the constitutionality of permitting transcription ofjury deliberations. The cases
discussed above, however, establish the principles necessary to resolve
the question. First, criminal defendants' rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments can be counterbalanced by significant
165

Id.

'
Id. For instance, the court suggested that breaching jury secrecy would be
appropriate to determine "whether ajuror's vote was predicated upon a bribe rather
than upon a conscientious evaluation of the evidence." Id. (citing Clark v. United
States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933)).
167Id. at 125.
'16 See id. at 126 ("Of additional significance is the state's purpose in requiring the

alternate to be a silent observer of the jury's deliberations.").
161 See id. at 126 n.8 (citing Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 243-44 (1978));
170 435 U.S. at
231.
171 See id. at 239 ("Because of the fundamental importance of
the jury trial .... any,
further reduction that promotes inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that
causes untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly representing their communities, attains constitutional significance.").
171 Id. at 244.
" See id.at 245.
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government interests. Second, jury secrecy is not a constitutional end
in itself, but can be breached to secure the rights of criminal defendants. This means that one can uphold the constitutionality of routine recording of jury deliberations for judicial review-even over a
criminal defendant's objection-in conformity with Supreme Court
precedent like Ballew, as interpreted by Johnson, and consistent with
the weight of federal-court opinion in the related area of Rule 24(c)
violations ofjury secrecy.174
Arguably, judicial review of jury deliberations furthers the fairtrial rights of criminal defendants as a class. Even if one assumes that
court-recording is the "sort of invasion of the jury's privacy that will
tend to stifle the jury's debate," 75 such review can provide a valuable
check on improper jury deliberations that are as dangerous to the
defendant's rights as is restricted debate. 76 For instance, if deliberations were reviewable, convictions based on consideration of matters
not in evidence or on impermissible bias against the defendant could
more readily be overturned!', Moreover, even if one thinks that
court recording of jury deliberations intrudes on the criminal defendant's rights, one can argue that the important governmental interests fostered by open proceedings (legitimacy, prevention of fraud,
and community therapeutic value) outweigh whatever infringement
the practice may involve.
2. Civil Trials
The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
of the
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court
law. 17 8
United States, than according to the rules of the common

'7 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738-39 (1993) (noting that intrusions

on the jury are generally to be analyzed for prejudicial impact rather than for constitutional violation).
Johnson, 650 F.2d at 125.
'7'
176

SeeAbramovsky, supra note 8 (recognizing that valid arguments can be made for

recording the jury as a routine procedure). But see id. at 40 (concluding that "[a]ny
good that would come from routine taping ofjury deliberations.., would be heavily
outweighed by the harm that would be done to the impartiality ofjuries").
'7

Of course, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the defendant against use of

the jury transcript against him after a not-guilty verdict. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb ....").
'7'Id. amend. VII.
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Unlike the Sixth Amendment, however, the Seventh Amendment is
not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment: "[T]he Seventh
Amendment applies only to proceedings in courts of the United
States and does not in any manner whatever govern or regulate trials
by jury in state courts or the standards which must be applied concerning the same." 17
This fact of nonincorporation is less important than it may first
appear. First, we are considering the recording of jury deliberations
in federal courts, where the Seventh Amendment expressly applies.
Second, almost all state constitutions "have civil jury trial provisions
roughly analogous in form and substance to the seventh amendment."'8 O It is likely that state courts look to federal Seventh Amendment jurisprudence in interpreting those provisions.'"' If state courts
interpret state constitutional provisions in accordance with federalcourt interpretations of substantially identical federal constitutional
provisions, the result for those states would seem to be the practical
equivalent of the incorporation of the federal provision into the

179 Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916);see
also

Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 169 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
Seventh Amendment is one of the few remaining provisions in the Bill of Rights which
has not been held to be applicable to the States."); Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931) ("The Fourteenth Amendment neither
implies that all trials must be byjury, nor guarantees any particular form or method of
state procedure."); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232 (1923) ("[T]he
deprivation of a right of trial by jury in a state court does not deny the parties due
process of law under the Federal Constitution."); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92
(1875) ("The States, so far as [the Seventh Amendment) is concerned, are left to
regulate trials in their own courts in their own ways. A trial byjury in suits at common
law pending in the State courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of national
citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to
abridge.").
"0 Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh
Amendment., 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 739 (1989); see also id. at 739 n.1l (noting such
provisions in the constitutions of every state except for Colorado and Louisiana).
'8' See id. at 739 n.12 (stating that Seventh Amendmentjurisprudence may constitute persuasive authority in state courts). For instance, state courts have looked to
Supreme Court interpretations of the Seventh Amendment in holding that remittitur
does not violate state constitutional rights to a civil jury trial. See, e.g., Lisle v. Willis,
463 S.E.2d 108, 110 (Ga. 1995) (following Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann,
130 U.S. 69 (1889)). Indeed, some state courts have even followed the more controversial federal additur jurisprudence. See Bressler v. Mull's Grocery Mart, 461 S.E.2d
124, 128 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that additur violates a state civiljury constitutional
provision except in narrow circumstances (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486
(1935))); cf. Carney v. Preston, 683 A.2d 47, 50 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating that the
Supreme Court's controversial Dimick decision cannot simply be ignored in a statecourt additur case, even though the state constitution in fact permits additur).
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Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, a review of the Supreme
for
Court's interpretations of the Seventh Amendment is appropriate
82
deciding the constitutionality of recording jury deliberations.
Aside from the difference on incorporation, Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence is quite similar to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Seventh Amendment "does not 'bind the federal courts to the
exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the
common law in 1791,' and '[n]ew devices may be used to adapt the
ancient institution to present needs and to make of it an efficient
instrument in the administration of justice.""
The analysis of a
particular procedure with respect to the jury is functional, just as it is
in the Sixth Amendment context.
Just as the Williams Court analyzed the function ofjury size in relation to the essential purposes of the criminal jury,'85 so the Court in
Colgrove stated:
Our inquiry turns, then, to whether ajury of 12 is of the substance of
the common-law right of trial by jury. Keeping in mind the purpose of
the jury trial in criminal cases to prevent government oppression, and,
in criminal and civil cases, to assure a fair and equitable resolution of
factual issues, the question comes down to whether jury performance is
a function ofjury size.186

The Court expressly stated that the sole purpose of the civil jury is
completely included as one of the two purposes of the criminal jury.
Consequently, the Seventh Amendment purpose/function analysis of
court recording of jury deliberations should track the Sixth Amendment analysis. The Sixth Amendment analysis established that court
recording ofjury deliberations promotes the purpose of fairness (for
example, by making the jury less likely to decide cases on matters not
in evidence or to bring impermissible bias to bear on their deci12

Cf Weiss, supra note 180, at 739 (noting that "state jury trial provisions

are.., amenable to seventh amendment analysis").
;SSee Colgrov4 413 U.S. at 151-52 (holding that the additional references to the
.common law" contained in the Seventh Amendment do not support a different
interpretation of the jury-trial right in civil as opposed to criminal cases, as regards the
number of constitutionally required jurors (following Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
86 (1970) (holding six-memberjuries in state criminal trials constitutionally permissible))).
" Id. at 156-57 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Galloway v.
United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943), and Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10

(1920)).
185 See Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-100 ("The relevant inquiry.., must be the function
that the particular feature performs and its relation to the purposes of thejury trial.").
16 Colgrove,413 U.S. at 157 (citations omitted).
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sions). ' 87 Insofar as this applies equally in the Seventh Amendment

context, the purpose/function analysis of transcription of civil-jury
deliberations is constitutionally permissible.
Of course, the Seventh Amendment does differ from the Sixth
Amendment in providing that no fact decided by a jury shall be reexamined in a federal court otherwise "than according to the rules of
the common law."Is Nonetheless, the common law provides numerous devices for taking cases away from the jury and restricting or
reviewing the jury's factfinding;' 9 these devices do not offend the
Seventh Amendment. 9 ' Recording the jury's deliberations, then,
does not involve any new kind of reexamination of fact that would
violate the Seventh Amendment. Rather, the procedure simply permits the court to review the jury's fact-finding according to the best
evidence, namely an actual transcript of the jury's deliberation.
B. Statutes andRules

Section 1508 of the federal criminal code bars recording of the
deliberations or voting of grand or petit juries; the statute also bars
nonjurors from listening to or observing such proceedings.' 9 ' The
statute does not prohibit ajuror from taking notes for the purpose of
assisting her to perform her duties as a juror.92 If courts are to begin
to experiment with the recording ofjury deliberations, without opening the floodgates to other types of court-authorized recording of
juries (such as television broadcast or observation by researchers), the
statute must be amended. A paragraph similar to the following
should be added to the statute:

117See supra Part 1V.A.1.

'88U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

89SeeJiAmEs ET AL., supra note 106, § 7.8 (discussing, inter alia, new trial, j.n.o.v.,
directed verdict, and special verdict). Both the new trial and the j.n.o.v. rest, in some
degree, on the reexamination of facts found.
'9' See id.§ 7.24, at 382 ("Granting new trials forjudicial errors,juror misconduct, a
verdict that is excessive or against the weight of the evidence, and 'all sorts of errors
and mistakes on the part of the jury' had become fairly well established at common
law by the late eighteenth century. This procedure, therefore, is regarded as consistent with the federal and typical state constitutional provisions guaranteeingjury trial:
(footnote omitted) (quoting E.W. Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Court to Review
Ruling on Motionfor New TWAi 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (1933))).
19, See 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1994).
'9 See id. ("Nothing... shall be construed to prohibit the taking of notes by a
grand or petit juror... for the purpose of assisting [her] in the performance of his
duties .... ").
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit judges or justices
in the courts of the United States from authorizing recording of petit'
jury deliberations for the purpose ofjudicial review. Nor shall this section be construed to prohibit a court or a party to a proceeding in which
a petit jury's deliberations have been recorded from reviewing the record of thatjury's proceedings, if the court permits.

Such an amendment of the statute not only makes possible the recording in the first instance, it also protects the parties from liability
for reviewing the transcript, which arguably would be criminal under
the current statute's prohibition of nonjuror observation of deliberations. By the same token, the amendment acknowledges that the
parties' access to the transcript depends on the leave of the court.
The court thus retains discretion to seal the transcript in the interest
of justice-for instance, from those who seek the transcript to harass
or retaliate againstjurors.'93
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits a juror's testimony
from being used to impeach the jury's verdict) 9' This Comment has
already examined the purpose of the rule and has suggested that the
proposal to record the jury's deliberations may violate the letter, but
not the spirit, of the rule.19' Accordingly, the rule should be amended
as follows:
Nothing in this rule prohibits any court of the United States, or the parties to an action with the permission of the trial court, from using a transcript ofjury deliberations for the purpose ofjudicial review. The trial
court may review the transcript or may seal the transcript, as the interest
ofjustice requires.

An important feature of such an amendment is that it leaves discretion with the trial court over the decision whether to give the parties
access to the transcript. The amendment also gives any federal court
the authority to use the transcript for the purposes ofjudicial review;
certainly an appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling on a deliberation transcript should have the same access to the transcript that
the trial court had.

" The proposed amendment to title 18 simply acknowledges the courts' authority
to seal the transcript; it should not be construed to imply an automatic limit on review
of the transcript. If Congress wishes to regulate the procedural use of the transcript,
such legislation clearly would belong in title 28.
'94 FED R. EVID. 606(b).

"5 SeesupraPartlIA2.
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V. NATURE AND SCOPE OFJUDICIAL REVIEW OF
COURT-RECORDEDJURY DELIBERATIONS

Two common criticisms ofjuries are that they often fail to decide
9
cases on the evidence (whether out of prejudice or incompetence)
and that they often fail to follow the law (out of ignorance or willfulness). 97 To some extent, the law provides a corrective mechanism for
these problems, through the motion for new trial. 98 The trial court's
power to grant a new trial is broad: "It embraces all the reasons which
inhere in the integrity of the jury system itself,"'9 and the judge
"should not hesitate to set aside [the jury's] verdict and grant a new
trial in any case where the ends ofjustice so require. "200 The exercise
of the power does not violate the Seventh
Amendment, "but is one of
21
the historic safeguards of that right." 1
The policy ofjury secrecy, however, especially in the civil context,
severely restricts the effectiveness of the new-trial motion:
A common ground for a motion for a new trial is that the jury, or members of it, has not performed in the fashion expected ofjuries. Attacks
on this ground are frequently abortive because... the circumstances
under which2 the jurors themselves may testify to impeach the verdict are
very limited. 02

"6 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 13, at 73-74 (memorandum submitted by Harry
Kalven, Jr.) (noting arguments that jurors are bad factfinders because they are not
expert in the weighing of evidence and because parties appeal to jurors' prejudices);
Marcus A. Brown, Commentary: Trial by Jury-An Obsolete Concept, 49 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 109, 109 (1995) ("UJ]urors may be swayed by appeals made to prejudice or
emotion and may be unable to evaluate the evidence placed before them.").
17See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 13, at 73-74 (memorandum submitted by Harry
Kalven, Jr.) (noting arguments that jurors are unable to understand the law and
unable to follow the court's instructions); Brown, supra note 196, at 109 ("Juries often
do not follow the law, either because they misunderstood the judge's instructions or
do not like a particular law.").
,o See generally 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2801-2810 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (discussing newtrial motion and grounds for a new trial).
"9 Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1962), quoted in
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2801, at 40.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 1941), quoted
in WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2801, at 41.
20'Yeatts, 122 F.2d at 353, quoted inWRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2801, at 40.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2810, at 105; see also 12JAMES W. MOORE
ET AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.23(3], at 59-40 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that a
motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict resulted from an improper motive
"will be difficult to support due to the common law rule prohibiting a juror from
impeaching the verdict").
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LiTW'ING THE CLOAK OFJURY SECRECY

The question to be examined in this Part is how the recording ofjury
deliberations should operate to correct verdicts rendered contrary to
the evidence or to the law. Two central points are to be established.
First, transcribing ofjury deliberations does not establish a new remedy; it merely rests an established remedy (the new trial) on a surer
evidentiary foundation. Second, transcribing jury deliberations will
not seriously infringe on the interest of judicial economy, which has
always been and remains adequately protected in the new-trial context by the harmless-error doctrine. 203 These two points hold true
regardless of whether the verdict is challenged as contrary to the
evidence or contrary to the law.
A. Verdicts Contrary to the Evidence
On a motion for new trial, the verdict loser may attack either the
weight of the evidence or the legal sufficiency of the evidence.0 4 The
judge must ensure that "the verdict is consistent with the evidence,"
but the judge must defer to the jury on matters within its province,
and "a new trial is warranted only if the verdict is so clearly against the
weight of the evidence as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of
justice., 20 5

Accordingly, while the grant or denial of the motion is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, reviewing courts

For simplicity of analysis, this Part will focus on federal practice and procedure
in civil trials.
2
SeeMOORE ET AL., supranote 202, § 59.25[1], at 59-46 (discussing verdict against
2'3

the weight of the evidence as ground for new trial and noting that new trial on this
ground can be awarded when evidence was legally insufficient but Rule 50(b) "j.n.o.v."

is unavailable (for instance, because the motion forj.n.o.v. is untimely made)).
Transcripts of jury deliberations would clearly be helpful on a weight-of-the-

evidence new-trial motion. In principle, a motion forj.n.o.v., or a new-trial motion,
based on the legal sufficiency of the evidence, should not be affected by the contents
of such a transcript. In practice, of course, it is possible that ajudge inclined to grant
aj.n.o.v. without a transcript could discover in the transcript a rational basis for the

verdict that otherwise would have eluded her. In other words, it is possible that a
transcript ofjury deliberations could prevent ajudge from wrongly entering aj.n.o.v.
Of course, other grounds for a new trial exist that involve the evidence: the size of
the verdict, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2807, and newly discovered
evidence, see id. § 2808. The former properly can be subsumed under the discussion
of the weight-of-the-evidence motion. Both grounds allege that the evidence does not
warrant the verdict; the difference between the motions is merely in the element of
proof on which the evidence is alleged to be scant.
2" MOORE ETAL.,

supra note 202, § 59.25[1], at 59-46.
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will inspect grants of the motion in the weight-of-the-evidence context
more closely than in other contexts.2 °
Taking these principles together, the weight-of-the-evidence motion for new trial seems to be a 'jury-rigged" solution to the problem
of the inadmissibility of juror testimony to impeach a verdict. The
motion is brought where the evidence in favor of the verdict is legally
sufficient, yet the verdict does not comport with the judge's assessment of the weight of the evidence. 7 We indulge the fiction that the
trial judge, in granting the motion, does not substitute her judgment
for that of the jury but acts only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
But the suspected miscarriage ofjustice is thought to have transpired
in the jury room; that is, something caused the jury to decide the case
contrary to what justice demands. Without a record of the jury's
deliberations, however, the suspicion of miscarriage is entirely speculative. It would be far better simply to examine what the jury in fact
did in the room. We then could arrive at a reliable determination of
whether the jury decided the case on the legally sufficient evidence or
instead perpetrated a miscarriage of justice. As it stands now, the
motion is made and granted on the least desirable of grounds: speculation as to why the jury decided as it did.
With a transcript of the jury's deliberation, the trial court can determine whether the jury in fact decided the case on improper
grounds. If it did, the movant deserves a new trial, since she has an
important right to have her cause decided only on the properly admitted evidence and the relevant law. 8 Concerns of judicial economy that properly figure in the common-law doctrines of new trial,
however, should be retained. Consequently, the movant should bear
a heavy burden of proof to rebut the presumption that a verdict on
legally sufficient evidence is properly rendered. By and large, the
harmless-error rule2°9 will give concerns of judicial economy all the

protection they require.

2" See id. § 59.25[2], at 59-47 to -48 (discussing stringency of appellate review of
trial court's grant of a new trial).
207See id. § 59.25[11, at 59-46 (noting that a new trial can be granted even when
evidence is legally sufficient to deny the ultimate verdict loser judgment as a matter of
law).
M See id. § 59.23[3], at 59-40 (stating that a new trial should
be granted when the
verdict is the result of "mistake, passion, prejudice, compromise, or improper motive"
on the jury's part, or where it is coerced by the court).
09 See FED. R. Civ. P. 61 ("The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights
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Consider, then, the chronic complaint aboutjuries: that they decide cases on matters not in evidence. The jury's mere consideration
of matters not in evidence should not result automatically in a new
trial in every case.2'0 The movant should first overcome the harmlesserror rule with a clear and convincing showing of prejudice in fact.
Nonetheless, on such a showing, the verdict should be set aside in
order to vindicate the movant's right to a fair trial.
B. Verdicts Contrary to the Law

The verdict loser has a difficult time winning a new trial on the
ground that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 211 Yet the situation is arguably more dire where the interest in
granting the new trial is even greater, namely, in cases where there is
ground to believe that the verdict resulted from jury misconduct or

of the parties."). For a comprehensive discussion of the harmless-error doctrine, see
& MILLER, supra note 198, §§ 2881-2883.
Assuming that the transcript reveals improper conduct by the jury, there are of
course two possible assignments of error: court error in denying a new trial on the
grounds of the jury's conduct, or jury error in the conduct itself. The harmless-error
rules are silent on the issue ofjury error, but such an error, like the errors specifically
mentioned in the rules, should be subject to the rule. Thus, an amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 to include error by the jury is proper. Because the
language of the criminal harmless-error rule is broader, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)
("Any error.., which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."), it needs
no amendment.
The phenomenon ofjury nullification raises policy questions that are beyond the
scope of this Comment. Therefore, it is merely noted that recording jury deliberations would provide evidentiary support for reversal of a nullification verdict. Whether
or not such reversal is proper is not within the scope of this Comment.
210 Indeed, there is good reason to presume that juries often discuss
improper
considerations, but this does not imply that they deliberate poorly:
[J]uries ... often discuss matters the judge told them to ignore or which were
not mentioned in the trial .... [I]rrelevant factors, including litigant personalities and social status, are most likely to intrude when the evidence is unclear....
Considering our knowledge of group decision-making-from formal studies of it, as well as the common experience of those who participate in such
activities-it would be utterly amazing to hear that irrelevancies did not sometimes creep into jury deliberations. What is impressive, based on a consensus
view of the research, is how little of it occurs.
JOHN GUINTHER, THEJURYIN AMERICA 88 (1988) (footnote omitted).
211 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 202, § 59.25[1]-[2], at 59-46 to -48 (noting that
new trial should only be granted based on a miscarriage ofjustice and noting that the
standard of appellate review of rulings on the motion leans heavily in favor of upholding the jury's verdict).
WRIGHT
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confusion.1 2 Again, the law's restriction of the availability of the best
evidence appears to impair the parties' fair-trial rights. 213 Moreover,
the admission of that best evidence would not be so costly to judicial
economy tojustify its continued exclusion.
Consider the other chronic complaint about juries: that they ignore or misunderstand the relevant law when they decide a case.
One might endeavor to improve jury instructions, increasing the
jury's understanding of the relevant law. But a more direct approach-observing the jury's deliberations to see whether it in fact
understood the law-is preferable. In fact, the two remedies are not
exclusive; but only the latter attempts to remedy juror misconstrual of
the law after it inevitably occurs.
Considerations ofjudicial economy require that a movant clearly
show more than that the jury merely was confused about the governing law or did not share the same understanding of it that the court
did. By the same token, a movant has a right to a new trial where the
record clearly and convincingly reveals that the jury's construal of the
relevant law was erroneous and the error was material to the outcome-that is, that the error prejudiced the movant in fact. But,
again, this is precisely the type of standard that would govern if the
record ofjury deliberations were admissible for review under a harmless-error standard.
In short, recording of jury deliberations will not involve the development of much new law of post-verdict review. Rather the practice will primarily serve to place review on the firm foundation of the
best available evidence. Considerations of judicial economy, currently protected with the ill-suited instrument ofjury secrecy, will not
be sacrificed by recording deliberations. The harmless-error rule will
continue to give these considerations their due, but in an atmosphere
of less legal fiction and more substantial justice.

2 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 202, § 59.23[3] (noting improperjury motivation

as ground for new trial and referring to "mistake, passion, prejudice, compromise, or
other improper motive"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2810 (noting misconduct affecting the jury as ground for new trial and referring to compromise, quotient
verdict, inconsistency, and failure to follow the court's instructions).
"' See MOORE ET AL., supra note 202, § 59.23 [3], at 59-40 (noting that the common-

law jury-impeachment rule renders a new-trial motion based on improper motive
"difficult to support"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 198, § 2810, at 105 (noting that
the common-law rule barring juries from impeaching their verdict frequently renders
ineffective a new-trial motion based on misconduct affecting the jury).
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CONCLUSION

The institution of the jury, like all our governmental institutions,
demands a balance between the competing virtues of public accountability and pragmatic tolerance of imperfection. The tradition ofjury
secrecy has for too long sacrificed the former to the latter. As the
demand for public accountability of the institution increases, more
and more public inquiries (especially media inquiries) into jury
deliberations appear. One does well to acknowledge the legitimacy of
the impulse toward inspection of the jury's conduct, even if one
opposes general publication of the contents of jury deliberations.
The public interest in accountability of the jury should be met by
giving the courts, rather than the press, access to the jury's deliberations, for the purpose of limited judicial review. Transcribing jury
deliberations for judicial review offends two acts of Congress, which
should be amended, but the practice does not offend the Constitution. Such transcription will enhance the legitimacy, rationality, and
fairness of jury trials, without unduly infringing on the dignity or
economy ofjudicial proceedings.
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